The Optimal Law Enforcement with Mandatory Defendant Class Actions

Introduction
The mass production society has evolved with great intensity since the enormous
progression of the communications network, especially the Internet, providing services and
goods (tangible and intangible) to hundreds of millions of people.
The 21st century conceives a high technology society with a permissibility of massive
unlawful behavior. The broad range of relationships set through the Internet and other
communications systems, sometimes agglomerating millions of people, allows a very
considerable number of transgressions of the law.
With such a scenario as a backdrop we are aiming at analyzing the law enforcement
system and the optimal mechanism to prevent and redress harms in the mass information
society by optimal deterrence, insurance and redistribution by means of mandatory defendant
class actions.
The article also addresses one of the most problematic issue related to defendant class
actions: the reluctance of the respondents to assume class representation and the absence of an
appropriate legal fees mechanism to motivate defendant class lawyers.
Our premise is that individuals are rational, meaning that they seek their maximum
welfare. Hence, the ideal legal system should improve individuals’ well-being by minimizing
the costs of accident risk. This task is best achieved by compulsory aggregation of claims and
defenses. The latter with incentives to encourage the use of defendant class actions by the
plaintiffs’ bar, but also by the defendants, in order to exploit scale of investment and economy
in common questions of the class defense.
We urge that the access to justice has to step forward into a combined strategy of the
substantive law and the procedural law by a collective litigation. This shall be developed on
the respondents’ pole perspective and under a theoretical frame to attain optimal individual
well-being and, consequently, a general social welfare.
Concerning with mass production accidents, the doctrine are used to consider the
victims’ angle, therefore, the plaintiffs’ side in litigation. This happens because, commonly,

the liability remains on the enterprises that create the risk and are responsible for the accidents
due to: defective design of products; hazardous safety measures for employees; unhealthy
environment for the population; and so long.
However, our approach is on the defendants in order to resolve, once and for all,
common questions within the defenses of the multitude of respondents to a lawsuit. Although
defendant class action has shown to be a very useful procedure for the plaintiffs, it is
important to demonstrate that it is also a functional device for the defendants. As we have
mentioned, the aggregation of defendants and defenses makes everyone better off, being the
defendant class action an essential legal instrument for the optimal law enforcement.
The objective of this article is to enhance the law enforcement by mandatory
aggregation of defendants and improvement of the mechanism to incentivize the class lawyer.
In Part I, some examples of conflictual relationships that arise out of the knowledge
society are selected and then briefly analyzed through different litigation strategies.
First, under an individual litigation, i.e., on case-by-case lawsuits; second, by bringing
lawsuits against parties hold responsible for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or
vicarious infringement; and third, in a defendants’ aggregative system.
Part II depicts the normative theory of individual rational choice that achieves the
optimal law enforcement system. It maximizes the individuals’ well-being putting everyone
behind a veil of ignorance. In this sense, it requires legal procedures mandating aggregation of
claims and defenses.
In Part III we summarize an explanatory view of the defendant class actions, its
origins and the requisites for its certification and maintenance under the current federal
statute.
Part IV analyzes the optimal aggregation of defendants. With this objective, we
examine the advantages of exploiting investment and economy scales through aggregation of
defenses.
Also, we challenge the assertion that the value of a day in court is antagonist to
mandatory class action, with the argument that individuals’ well-being is attained by
representative suits.

Moreover, we demonstrate that the defendant class actions are a legal device that,
while enhances everyone’s welfare, is useful for plaintiffs’ bar as well as for defendants,
working as a protective device against threats of nuisance value suits.
In addition, we procure to furnish the appropriate incentives for aggregation of
defendants by adequate attorney fees methods. With a propositional approach, we compile the
actual methods to grant attorney fees in class actions and its application to the defendant class
counsel.

I. The 21st Century Mass Society
The idea of “mass society” has evolved in time. Firstly, it reflected the beginning of
the industrialization in the 18th century, when the transformation of the means of production
from artisanal craftwork to large scale machinery work, forged the concept of mass
production (of tangible goods). Since, the notion of “mass society” is part of the collective
conscience.
However, in the 21st century, we are living in an information society, where furnishing
services and goods are made by sophisticated communications links, especially by Internet. In
addition, many tangible goods are now intangible (for example, a book can be obtained by
downloading a program by Internet and be read without being touched, with no physical
contact, just rolling the computer bar); business are faster celebrated with new ways of
expressing consideration; and, parties are located anywhere in the world.
In like degree, it is quite fair to say that one of the most extraordinary advancement in
the contemporary society has been the creation and diffusion of the Internet. To have an idea
of the immeasurable growth of the users of the Internet is enough to reveal that in the United
States, in four years, it has reached the number of 50 millions while to get this number,
television took 13 years, personal computer 16 years, and the radio 38 years.1
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Data obtained from the “Sociedade da Informação no Brasil - Livro Verde”, 3 (“Information Society in Brazil Green Book”). This study is the result of the work developed by the Brazilian Science and Technology Ministry
containing the goals for the implementation of the Information Society Program and is formed by a consolidated
summary of the applications of the information technologies.

The possibility of people to communicate to each other, from a computer connection,
to access banking data, or, to accomplish business all over the globe, is a phenomenon of
integration and development of the civilization.
The so-called “information society” resemblances the new face of the “mass society”.
It generates a new step in the relationship among nations, influencing political and
economical systems and even the sovereignty of each the people. In Brazil, for example, the
Information Society Program intends to impose a shared responsibility among private
initiative sectors (entrepreneurial and civil society) and the public sector, aiming at
“integrating, coordinating and incentivizing actions for the use of communication and
information technologies as a mean to contribute to the social inclusion of all Brazilian
citizens in the new society and, at the same time, to contribute to the country economy to gain
conditions to compete in the global market”.2
To that extent, the great challenge is to make use of the advanced communication
knowledge and the Internet to promote the enrichment of the modern culture under a human
and ethic perspective and not just to employs it as a technological device, without aggregating
better life conditions to the entire information society.
Lawyers, judges, public prosecutors, in summary, the whole legal community much
more than being alert to the mentioned advent, shall act affirmatively, proposing changes,
trying to furnish normative elements for the relationships created by this new “mass society”.3
Consequently, the random offer of goods and services to hundreds of thousands of
people induces lawful and unlawful behaviors. For instance, satellite television network: one
may assume that most of the consumers act in a proper manner paying for the service;
nonetheless, others may utilize some sort of gadget in order to receipt the transmission
without retribution. Similarly, downloading music and films by the Internet: some users will
pay for obtaining the music and films and others will simple infringe the copyrighted works.
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“Sociedade da Informação no Brasil - Livro Verde”, 10.

I use the locution “legal community” to express a broader meaning than “law operators”, i.e., lawyers, judges
and public prosecutors. Referring to “legal community” one may include a person or an entity that is direct
involved with and influenced by any specific domain or area of the law. For example, tenants in general are part
of the legal community regarding proposed legislation that may interfere with their lease agreements.

In this sense, there is a substantial modification on the law enforcement that has to be
realized by the law operators and a choice of solutions to be made in order to achieve the
optimal enforcement level.
On one hand, there is the possibility to file lawsuits separately, one by one, against
individual wrongdoer. Is easy to verify that this path, not even by far, accomplish the
objectives of compensation and deterrence of the law.
This strategy has been largely employed by DirecTV, a company that broadcasts
television programs through satellite transmissions. The satellite technology used by DirecTV
requires the installation of a satellite dish, an integrated receiver/decoder and an access card.
DirecTV had sent thousands of letters to persons alleging that they would be stealing
the company’s satellite signal by using modified DirecTV access cards (“smart cards”) and
offered a settlement agreement.4 The smart cards are said to be a device that may be used in
legal and meaningful purposes.5
In addition, DirecTV has created an Internet site that “provides information
concerning civil actions brought by DirecTV against those who fraudulently obtain DirecTV
programming without authorization by and proper payment to DirecTV or illegally design,
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The settlement agreement inserted in the “cease and desist” letters consisted of: “(1) surrender illegally
modified Access Cards or other satellite signal theft devices in your possession, custody or control; (2) execute a
written statement to the effect that you will not purchase or use illegal signal theft devices to obtain satellite
programming in the future, nor will you have an involvement in the unauthorized reception and use of the
DirecTV’s satellite television programming; and (3) pay a monetary sum to DirecTV for your past wrongful
conduct and the damages thereby incurred by the company”, see, http://www.directvdefense.org/files (last
visited in March 17th, 2006).
5

“Smart cards are an important, and legal, branch of emerging technology, but satellite TV giant DirecTV has
launched a legal campaign that threatens smartcard researchers and innovators. Over the past few years, the
company has sent hundreds of thousands of demand letters and filed nearly 24,000 federal lawsuits in response
to the mere purchase of smart card readers, emulators, unloopers, reprogrammers, bootloaders, and blockers. The
satellite TV company accuses techies – some of whom threw out their televisions in favor of the Internet long
ago – of using these devices to illegally intercept its signals. But the smart card readers and their various
derivatives are capable of so much more: they secure computer networks, enable user-based identification, and
further scientific discovery. People who intercept DirectTV’s satellite signal are breaking the law. However,
DirecTV’s cease and desist letter campaign does not distinguish the legitimate users from the thieves. This
website is meant as a legal resource for the legitimate computer scientists, technology workers, and hobbyists
who are being harassed by DirecTV's no holds-barred slash-and-burn legal strategy. This site provides scientists,
researchers, innovators and their lawyers with the resources necessary to fight DirecTV and protect their right to
own and use multi-purpose technology for its legal applications – and without fear of reprisal”, see,
http://www.directvdefense.org/ (last visited in March 17th, 2006).

manufacture, market, sell, or use devices that allow access to satellite signals without payment
to DirecTV”.6
According to the referred site, over 25,000 individuals had been suited for fraud and
piracy in violating television satellite signal. One can realize that this is a small number
comparing with the estimate for this year that the number of violators of DirecTV’s signal
may reach 3.3 million people, according to the Carmel Group, a communications-consulting
firm, cited by Forbes Magazine journalist, Dorothy Pomerantz.7
On the other hand, the ideal solution is to aggregate all claims and defenses, so uniting
plaintiffs and defendants in collective litigation.
In some instances, litigation direct to the commonly called “gatekeepers” may be the
ideal solution to resolve the conflict over an unnumbered parties.8 The procedure is to bring a
lawsuit against persons or entities that furnish the market with the resources that allow the
wrongful behavior.
Considering the previous examples, the suit is to be filed against hardware
manufactures and or computer technicians that develop and produce tools enabling
unauthorized satellite television transmission. In the second case, the action is brought against
the enterprises that provide file sharing services through peer-to-peer network (“p2p”) or
freely distribute software that permits downloading copyrighted works through the Internet
without any retribution to the copyrights’ holders.9
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http://www.hackhu.com, last visited March 17th, 2006.
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Stealing the Show, available at http://www.forbes.com/2003/05/29/cz_dp_0529directv.html, (last visited in
March 17, 2006).
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The strategy of enforcing the law against the “gatekeepers”, as third-party liability, is fully discussed in Reiner
H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of Third-Party Enforcement Strategy 2 J. L. Econ & Org. 53 (1986);
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Control, 93 Yale L. J. 857 (1983-1984). See, also, Assaf
Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 53 (2003-2004). For the view of the plaintiffs’ attorneys as the
system’s gatekeepers, see, David Rosenberg, The Casual Connection in Mass Exposure Case: a “Public Law”
Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 889-92 (1983-1984); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 Ind. L. J. 561, 574-5 (1986-1987).
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See, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F. 3d
643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

In one of the most recent case, the Supreme Court held companies secondary liable on
the theory of contributory and vicarious infringement because they provided software to
consumers that use them to violate copyrighted works:
“The argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is, however, a powerful one,
given the number of infringing downloads that occur every day using StreamCast’s and
Grokster’s software. When a widely shared service or product is used to commit
infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively
against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the
distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or
vicarious infringement. See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 645-646
(CA7 2003). One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging
direct infringement, see Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,
443 F2d 1159, 1162 (CA2 1971), and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it, Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (CA2 1963)”.10
Notwithstanding, our focus is in an alternative for law enforcement in the information
society: the defendant class action.11
The option for defendant class action takes into consideration the deterrence function
of the law and civil as well as its insurance objective. As a result, the ideal of distributive
justice is better served. The procedural law has to be seeing as a tool to achieve the principles
enacted in the substantive law.12
Regardless of the eternal debate concerning the distinction between substantive law
and procedural law, which is beyond the objective of this work, it is important to realize that
the science of law has for a long time matured and does not considered any longer the
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MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, (2005)
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See, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Enforcing the Social Compact Through Representative Litigation, 33 Conn. L. Rev.
1239, 1239-40, 1254-6 (2000-2001) (analyzing the mass tort in the 21st century and reinforcing the use of class
actions).
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See, Part II, infra.

procedural law an appendix of the substantive law, or even, a domain of law that has an end
on its own.13
Procedural law has to be applied in order to carry out the objectives of the substantive
law. The legal process is the instrument to perform the goals of social’s peace, equality and
welfare that are within the principles of the substantive law. Hence, using the tools that are
provided by legal proceedings shall not be considered as violating the Rules Enabling Act14 or
the Rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15
We urge that the access to justice has to step forward into a combined strategy of the
substantive law and the procedural law by a collective litigation developed on the
respondents’ pole perspective and under a theoretical economic feature to attain optimal
individuals’ well-being.16
13

For further discussion about the distinction between substantive law and procedural law, see, generally, Walter
Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L. J. 333 (1932-1933)
(discussing that the purpose of the characterization is the element for distinguishing a law as substantive or
procedural); Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the
Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47. S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1973-1974) (discussion within consumer class action
context; starts from an analysis of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. (312 U.S. 1 - 1941) and Hanna v. Plumer (380 U.S.
460 - 1965), and proposes a “widespread publicly controversy” test to define the substantive or procedural nature
of the statute); Carole E. Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 Stan. L. Rev.
397 (1975-1976) (criticizing, in the class action context, the decisions in Snyder v. Harris (394 U.S. 332 - 1969)
and Zahn v. International Paper Co. (414 U.S. 291 - 1973) that did not permit that procedural changes
influenced jurisdictional decisions, and, suggesting that a procedural rule is consistent with the provisions of the
Rule 82, of the Fed. R. Civ. P., solely if it has a procedure purpose which implementation is not barred by a
jurisdictional rule); Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 Duke L.
J. 281 (1989) (discussing an ambivalent nature, substantive-procedural, of the statutes of limitation); Elizabeth
Barke Brandt, Fairness to the Absent Members of a Defendant Class: a Proposed Revision of Rule 23, 1990
BYU L. Rev. 909 (1990) (criticizing the decision in United States v. Trucking Employers Inc. (72 F.R.D. 98 –
1976) that allowed certification of class action with expansion of jurisdiction and venue, therefore, violating the
Rule 82, of the Fed. R. Civ. P).
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28 U.S.C.A. § 2072. Rules of procedure and evidence: power to prescribe.
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power t prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and
rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof)
and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such
rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section
1291 of this title.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 82. Jurisdiction and venue unaffected.
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts
or the venue of actions therein. An admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h) shall not be
treated as civil action for the purposes of Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 1391-1392.
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This position advances the three “waves” for the access to justice generated from the meticulous world survey
concerning that matter, chiefly organized by Professor Mauro Cappelletti, by reinforcing that the distributive

We aim at demonstrating that the defendant class action is the law enforcement
mechanism that obtains the individual welfare under both ex ante and ex post perspectives.17
Distinguishing wrongdoers from the law-abiding public, the defendant class action
operates a deterrence effect impeding the under-deterrence that occurs when the mentioned
difference is not made.
Assuredly, the lack of distinction induces and awards the illegal conduct, as the
wrongdoers are certain that they are not going to be prosecuted. Their harm is not redressed.
The collectivized litigation resolves, once and for all, all common questions involving
claims, issues and defenses, optimizing investment in precautionary measures to perform the
best deterrence and enhancing judicial and process resources resulting in the ideal
compensation.18
In addition, from the sole perspective of the aggregation of the wrongdoers, the class
action procedure, confers multiple defendants economy of scale for the litigation,
consequently, the advantage for exploiting it to maximize their resources in common
defenses, achieving the desired ex post litigation status.
The early lesson of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes questioning how much it is
desirable to the public to insure the safety against liability is still updated.19
The answer that we advocate is of an ideal model of law enforcement system that
grants everyone the best well-being, before and after the fact of a given situation, due to
optimal deterrence of unreasonable risks, optimal insurance of reasonable risks, and optimal
redistribution of wealth by progressively funding the preceding two elements.

justice demands joint theoretical and pragmatical application of substantive and procedural laws. See, Mauro
Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, Access to Justice. A World Survey, 5-124 (Milan: Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore,
1978.Vol. I, Book 1).
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See, Part II, B, infra.
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See, Part II, C, infra.
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“Our law of torts comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, assaults, slanders, and the like,
where the damages might be taken to lie where they fell by legal judgment. But the torts with which our courts
are kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents of certain well known business. They are injuries to person or
property by railroads, factories, and the like. The liability for them is estimated, and sooner of later goes into the
price paid by the public. The public really pays the damages, and the question of liability, if pressed far enough
is really the question how far it is desirable that the public should insure the safety of those whose work it uses”;
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 466 (1897).

II. The Normative Theory of Individual Rational Choice
A. Introduction
The premise of our analysis is that the defendant class action is an important legal
instrument to enforce the law, and as a consequence, requires incentives to be optimally
employed.
In accordance, despite of the fact that collectivized litigation had majorly being
considered under the plaintiffs’ perspective by the statutes, the authorities and the academics,
it is undeniable that the aggregation of defenses is a powerful device. For that reason it should
not be disregarded to be contemplated globally with the plaintiffs’ class action in the effort of
enhancing optimal law enforcement.
It is important to note that the aggregation of defendants may serve the interests of the
plaintiff, because ordinarily it is the plaintiff whom requires the certification of a defendant
class, but the defendant class action also operates on behalf of the defendants.20
The justification of our proposition is based on the argument that individuals are
rational, meaning that they seek their maximum well-being. Hence, the ideal legal system
should improve individuals’ welfare by improving the law enforcement. As a consequence,
optimal social welfare is accomplished. This task is best achieved by aggregation of claims
and defenses, the latter with incentives to encourage the use of defendant class action.21
20
21

See, Part IV, infra.

Much of the text developed here is based upon on Professor David Rosenberg’s theory of mass tort law
enforcement, presented throughout several works: David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3)
Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19 (2003); Charles Fried and David Rosenberg,
Making Tort Law: What Should be Done and Who Should do It (The AEI Press, 2003) (cited hereafter as Fried
and Rosenberg, Making Tort Law); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for
Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831 (2002); David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation
Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1871 (2002); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort
Class Action: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 393 (2000); Bruce L. Hay and
David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1377 (2000); David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass
Exposure Cases, 71 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 210 (1996); David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort
Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B. U. L. Rev. 695 (1989); David Rosenberg. Class Actions for Mass
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 Ind. L. J. 561 (1986-1987); David Rosenberg. The
Casual Connection in Mass Exposure Case: a “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849

Regardless that the theory is methodologically developed in relation to tort law, it is a
normative theory of rational individual choice concerning law enforcement, and so the word
“accident” may and is employed in a broader sense of wrongful conduct violating the law.22
Economists refer to this method of policy assessment dependent on individuals’ wellbeing as welfare economics, as explained by Professors Kaplow and Shavell:
“The welfare economic conception of individuals’ well-being is a comprehensive one. It
recognizes not only individuals’ level of material comfort, but also their degree of
aesthetic fulfillment, their feelings for others, and anything else that they might value,
however intangible”.23
We are employing an operational, functional method of study, based on an economic
analysis of the defendant class action, so we find important to expunge the myth that
economics deals with money: it is related to resources, its uses and scarcity.24 25

(1983-1984); David Rosenberg, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation of Similar Claims: The Superiority of Class
Action vs. CollaterEstoppel vs. Standard Claims Market, Harvard Law School, Public Law Research Paper no
44 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=354100.
22

Mutatis mutandis, see, Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1970) (cited hereafter as Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents). See, also, David L. Shapiro,
Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 920 n. 12 (1997-1998) (stating that
the distinction between tort and contract is hard to draw because the former often arises in context of contractual
arrangement, justifying the inclusion of the latter, for analysis of class action, in the same category of the torts).
23

Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 968 (2000-2001).
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Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 6 (Aspen 2003) (cited hereafter as Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law); Some Uses and Abuses in Economics in Law, 46 Chi. L. Rev. 281 (1978-1979).
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For precursors works about the economic analysis of the law, see Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts of Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L. J. 499 (1960-1961); The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and
Economic Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) (cited hereafter as Calabresi, The Costs of
Accidents); and, R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). For some major modern
works, see Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 3-16 (cited in note 21); William M. Landes and Richard A.
Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: an Economic Analysis, 9 L. Legal Stud. 517 (1980); Steven Shavell,
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 1-5 (Harvard University Press 2004) (cited hereafter as Shavell,
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, published in
John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper Series No. 396,
available at http://law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center; Kaplow and Shavell, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961 (cited in
note 20); A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (Aspen 2003).

In addition, we are aware of some contention on the economic approach of the law,
however, a defense of its appropriateness is without the scope of this work.26
We simply argue that questions, for instance, concerning the morality of compensation
with money damages for the contraction of asbestoses, or, about the justice of taking the
doctor’s eye to redress the patient’s loss of an eye due to medical negligence, are metajuridical, in our view, and so far, they are out of the range of our article.
The economic perspective applied herein does not serve any ideology; there is no
intention to approach the substantive law in a critique manner. The normative description of
the law is a meta-discussion in relation to the optimal enforcement system under an economic
perspective.
B. The social welfare and the ex ante and ex post perspectives
Imagine the following scheme where a driver is preparing for a car trip and has to
choose between two different roads. The first highway has a toll that charges ten dollars per
automobile. The price of the toll is justified to fund the cost of several safety features such as
new pavement; four paths; wide paths; hard shoulders; night illumination; assistance phones
every five miles etc. The second one does not charge a toll fare, but the pavement is old and in
some places it is ruined, there is only one path to go and another to comeback; the path is
narrow; there is no assistance phone etc.
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We referred the interested reader in a critique of the economic analysis of the law to: Athur Allen Leff,
Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451 (1974) (argues that Posner’s
theory belongs to the American Legal Nominalism, which bestows on circular vicious rationale concepts that
neither consider arbitrary normative propositions of Formalism or empirical propositions of Realism, and can not
adequately analyzes human activity); Law and, 87 Yale L. J. 989 (1977-1978) (a broader critique to the
possibility of a scientific analysis of the law); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy is Dear at any Price: a Response to
Professor Posner’s Economic Theory, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 429 (1977-1978) (criticizing Posner’s theory of privacy for
being simplistic and, therefore, rather avoiding than confronting the complexity of the legal rules); Ronald
Dworkin, Why efficiency? A response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 563 (1979-1980);
Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. Legal Stud. 191 (1980) (affirming that “the descriptive claims of economic analysis as
they have so far been presented, are radically incomplete”); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a
Normative Principle, 9 J. Legal Stud. 227 (1980) (arguing that wealth maximization is an absurd principle and
an unsound ideal); Gary Minda, Toward a more ‘Just’ Economics of Justice – a Review Essay, 10 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1855 (1989); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: the Role of Consent in the Moral and Political
Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 384 (1985).

Assuming that individuals are rational and, hence, seek to maximize their well-being,
the driver will prefer to take the best road aiming to avoid any accident. In accordance to this
rationale, this is a decision that he makes before traveling. Before traveling the driver will
choose the safety road instead of the unsafety one, even though he has to pay a ten dollar toll
fare.27
“Behind a veil of ignorance” – expression created by the juris-philosopher John Rawls
– our driver would prefer to pay the toll to use the best road. He changes his option after being
certain to have made a secure trip.28
In accordance to John Rawls theory, people in the original position are behind a veil of
ignorance so that any principles agreed to will be just. The only particular facts parties know
are that their society is subject to circumstances of justice whatever it implies, and, general
facts that affect their choice of the principles of justice. No considerations of concept of
justice can be advanced unless it is a rational one, supplementing the lack of knowledge of the
original position. The evaluation of principles is made in harmony to its general and public
recognition and universal application because it will be complied by everyone. And a rational
deliberation, assuming certain conditions and restrictions, reach a certain conclusion as that a
certain concept of justice would be chosen in the original position. However, the original
position is not an original pact or agreement; it is one that, under certain conditions and
restrictions, anyone in anytime can adopt its perspective. And these requirements are the veil
of ignorance.29
The evolution of John Rawls’ thoughts merged his comprehensive liberal theory into a
political conception of justice and fairness. He reinforced the idea of the veil behind ignorance
where the parties are rational, distinguishing rationality from reasonableness and from special
27

Throughout this article we are going to use masculine pronouns for generic reference and not in a gendered
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A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. Working on welfare economics and theory
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choices involving risk, as they both are based on this same principle of equal chance without previous
knowledge of fate (John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in Theory of Risk-Taking, 61
Pol. Econ. 434 (1953).
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Id., 118-123. For a critique of the theory of rational behaviour and the response thereto, see, Rosenberg, 2003
U. Chi. Legal F. 19, 25 n. 13 (cited in note 21).

psychologies like envy and spite. Rationality is understood in an economic way thus the
parties can rank their final ends consistently. In order to establish the concept of justice as
fairness, Rawls enumerate a list of five primary goods to north the parties as they are behind
the veil of ignorance, which prevents them from knowing the doctrines and conceptions of
goods of the persons they represent.30
The choice an individual makes in order to maximize his well-being is sensibly
different when he knows, or, does not, the situation yet to come. Arguing that individuals are
rational, meaning that they seek their maximum well-being, the ideal legal system should
augment individuals’ welfare by minimizing the sum of accident costs, what is optimally
obtained with the reinforcement of the legal mechanism for aggregation of claims and
defenses. Consequently, optimal social welfare is obtained. Somewhat accounting on these
premises, Professor Rosenberg states:
“My argument proceeds from the premises that the legal system should aim to improve
individuals’ well-being and that individuals seek to maximize their own welfare. In
short, in the face of accident risks, the legal system should do what an individual
seeking maximum welfare would prefer. To explain what such a legal regime would
look like, I adopt and justify the “ex ante” perspective, which places individuals “behind
a veil of ignorance”, without information about their particular situations in the “ex
post” world to come of accident risk and scarce resources”.31
The rational individual makes different choices whether he is facing an uncertainty or
a certainty state of the world. Putting in other words, there is a sensible difference on an
individual choice between two states of the world: before and after a certain situation.

30

Justice as Fairness. A Restatment, 87-8 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). The goods, as things
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liberties: freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; (ii) freedom of movement and free choice of occupation
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Rosenberg, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 840 (cited in note 21); Rosenberg, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1879 (cited in note
21); Rosenberg, 71 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 210, 252-7 (cited in note 21).

Now consider the same individual after the trip in our example. Contrary to his ex ante
choice, after performing a secure trip, the driver would prefer to save the toll money and
travel throughout the unsafety highway. Discovering his fate - “the luck of the draw” - the
individual change his option and disregards of the optimal system legal system, e.g., the
driver does not care anymore to fund the cost for the best highway for everyone; ex post, he
cares only about his self-interest of saving the toll money.
“Crucially, ex ante and ex post preferences are mutually exclusive concerning the
fundamental purpose of the legal system in managing accident risk. Ex ante, before
knowing the relevant accident and legal fates, individuals would rationally prefer a legal
system that promotes the collective interest in minimizing the sum of accident costs,
particularly through optimal precautions, insurance, and redistribution. In contrast, ex
post, after knowing the ‘luck of the draw’, individuals rationally prefer a legal system
that promotes their separate interests regardless of the consequences of minimizing total
accident costs (…)”.32
Accordingly, the mutually exclusive preference is made between a world of
“uncertainty”, ex ante, before the fact, and, another made after the fact, ex post, under a
“certainty” of the state of the world. The individual’s response is absolutely contrary in each
one of these situations. Before knowing the future, the fate, the accident, he chooses a secure
highway in order to prevent any accident; after the safety trip, he would have chosen to have
saved the toll money and to drive in the not so safe highway.
The individual, ex ante, prefers a legal system that accomplish the collective goal of
minimizing the sum of accidents; oppositely, ex post, he chooses one that enhances his private
interests despite of the goal of ideal reduction of the costs of accidents.
Three elements should constitute the ideal legal system to optimally reduce the sum of
cost of accidents: optimal precautions to avoid unreasonable risks, optimal insurance for the
residual reasonable risks, and, distributive mechanism to fund the preceding functions.
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The reasoning developed demonstrates that the optimal social welfare is achieved with
an aggregative solution, conferring the best well-being to each and every individual, not
mattering if a prospective plaintiff or defendant in a future lawsuit.
C. The Elements for the Optimal Legal System to Reduce the Costs of Accidents
Employing a legal system that minimizes the cost of accidents, therefore distributing
more welfare, increases everyone’s well-being in any state of the world, in both ex ante and
ex post perspectives.33
Common sense idea states that it is better to prevent than to redress and demonstrates
that, in general, the deterrence function of the law precedes its compensation function.34
The deterrent function or effect of a legal provision is always prescribed in the primary
norm of the rule, establishing the conduct that is either permitted, or prohibited, or mandated,
according to the three deontic modals of the law.
In some sense the deterrent effect is compared to a behaviour modification feature,
nevertheless, the primary norm of the rule stipulates the conduct, while the secondary norm of
the same rule carries the sanction for the violation of the former.35
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Hence, the deterrence purpose of the law should provide the force for the performance
of its provisions by threatening firms with liability for full recovery of costs of the harms
provoked by them.
The optimal deterrence prevents risks that are costly to incur than to avoid, the socalled unreasonable risks. To achieve social welfare and maximize the individuals’ wellbeing, the investment of social resources in preventing risks must go further to the point that
any additional unit of expense in precautionary measures exceeds the benefit of additional risk
avoided.36
In one hand, over to ideal level, investments in order to prevent risks of accidents will
provoke an over-deterrence effect. The excessive cost for precautions is internalized by the
firms into over-priced goods and services that unbalance the market. Ordinarily, there is a
constraint of the demand due to the elevation of the price of the goods and services that do not
correspond any longer to their expected utility.
On the other hand, absence of threatening firms with liability for the complete cost of
their accidents might create an under-deterrence effect. It means that firms will invest less
than the optimal pattern to avoid risk, what should probably increase the number of accidents
making everyone worse off.
Under optimal deterrence there is a social gain as well as an individual gain. The
social welfare is a result of the individuals’ expected utility as one internalizes the total costs
and benefits of the optimal precaution model that prevents unreasonable risk.37
The second function of civil liability law is to compensate harm inflicted to victims.
The best way, in the optimal legal system seeking to confer maximum well-being to rational
individuals by reduction of sum of the cost of accidents, is via optimal insurance for injures
that arises out of reasonable risks.38
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The reasonable risk is the one that costs society more to avoid than compensate hence
it is not worth to invest any extra social resource in precaution as there will be no gain of the
additional risk avoidance.
And what would consist of the optimal insurance for compensating the reasonable
risk? The answers is full coverage is the optimal insurance for the risk-averse individuals once
it covers all the residual risk that is not prevented by deterrence, and it reflects the ideal
coverage where an additional investment in the premium yields negative marginal benefits,
i.e., does not generate any return from the insurance policy.
“Essentially, full insurance coverage equalizes individual’s marginal utility from wealth
between the accident and no-accident states and thus increases expected utility. The
individual effectively employs insurance to transfer wealth from the no-accident state to
the accident state up to the point at which an additional dollar of wealth yields the same
marginal utility in either state”.39
The characteristic of risk-aversion people is that the marginal utility of the money
diminishes as his wealth increases. The more money one has, the less utility he obtains from
getting more money. Putting it in another way, it is greater the reduction of utility if one
looses a certain amount of money compared with the increased utility for gaining the same
amount of money.40
The high number of insurance policy acquisition evidences that most of the people are
risk-averse in most of life risk situations.41

$100, for the expected cost of coverage is $100. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 258 n. 2
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The preference for optimal deterrence instead of compensation is more than a common
sense idea, as we have noticed above. The individual ex ante would prefer a legal system that
employs the scarce resources in attaining optimal deterrence rather than insuring unreasonable
risk.42
Furthermore, even a full restitution in integrum for exclusively money damages
compensation may not bring the victim to the original position before the injury. This happens
because there are other elements that are not completely recouped with money, such as time
dispensed with recovery measures, distress due to the violation of the right etc.43
The actual tort system combining deterrence and compensation functions for damages
may lead to a misinterpretation in the sense that optimal insurance of unreasonable risk should
prevail over its optimal deterrence. The solution to this problem, as proposed by Professor
Rosenberg, is to decouple deterrence and compensation effects of civil tort liability.44
In class action litigation, this objective is reached by creating an insurance fund
judgment separating deterrence and compensation in two different stages.
The judgment determines the an debeatur by establishing liability and fixing a global
amount for compensation, and then the court stipulates the quantum debeatur to be paid
individually according to the severity of harm.
In the first one, the deterrence function of the law, the court imposes liability and
stipulates the aggregate damages.45
In the second stage, compensation operates optimal insurance function by averaging
specific-claims variables unrelated to the severity of loss. Hence, the redistribution of wealth
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due to the claims observes the severity of each loss, averaging other variables not related to
the severity of the loss, in accordance to the evidence produce in this phase of the action.46
In a nutshell, another solution with the same theoretic basis of separating the
deterrence and insurance effects of the law would require modification of the actual statutory
and contractual governing laws. Deregulating insurance subrogation would allow
governmental and commercial first-party insurers to acquire the complete ownership and
control of claims, including non-pecuniary, punitive and otherwise damages. The insured, on
the other side, would get a premium discount according to an average amount of the
prospective recovery of damage-claims.47
Considering the wealth differences between people in the real world and the huge
social resources that are consumed in an ideal legal system to perform optimal deterrence and
insurance, which is funded by the beneficiaries through market prices paid for products,
services, labor and taxes for government, the ex ante rational individual prefers a system that
mandates funding this provisions for redistribution to the less fortunate.48
“Because such redistribution may depress incentives for productive enterprise and thus
the availability of the goods at any level, the individual ex ante rationally prefers that
system optimize the trade-off between wealth variation to motivate work on one hand
and wealth invariance to fund progressively the availability of basic goods”.49
The mutually exclusive preference between the ex ante and the ex post perspectives, as
we have seem in the previous item, attempts to undermine the optimal progressive funding for
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the legal system. The “lucky” individual tends to exit or underfund the arrangement as he
does not have, ex post, incentives to support it.
However, these difficulties can be obviated, as explained by Professors Fried and
Rosenberg, because the rational individual prefers some level of the called progressive
funding of optimal deterrence and insurance, consistently with any level of wealth
redistribution that optimizes the trade-off between redistribution to the less well off and
productive enterprise.50
Another feature has to be pointed out. Individual’s preferences are mutually exclusive
in the ex ante and ex post universes. While before knowing his luck, he prefers a optimal legal
system to minimize the costs of accidents, after the concretization of fate, his option is to
maximize his interests disregarding of the consequences of reducing total accident costs.
Consequently, the individuals’ would choose, ex ante, a legal system that impedes one
to opt-out or act in conflict to it, ex post.
Charles Fried and David Rosenberg nominated this mechanism as “mast tying”,
because it prohibits individuals, ex post, from opting out of the system or acting in conflict
with its rules, in a manner that makes it inefficient to provide optimal deterrence,
compensation and redistribution that the individuals have chosen ex ante.51
Choices of firms to refrain from investing optimally in precautions, because the
accidents have already occurred, or, choices of individuals to not compensating those that
50
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suffered accidents, because they were lucky and had escaped; or even, choices of the wealthy
ones to not fund redistribution by granting benefits to the less wealthy, would destroy the
optimal legal system of precaution and insurance, founded on the original position of absence
of knowledge of the world to come, the world behind the veil of ignorance.
“The individual would choose a legal system that minimized the sum of accident costs
through progressively funded optimal precautions and optimal insurance and precluded
individuals ex post from opting out that mandate or otherwise acting in conflict with it.
Individuals wish to “tie themselves to the mast” to ensure that the socially optimal and
individually beneficial preferences they chose ex ante will be carried out in the ex post
world”.52
As we can realize, the rational individual would choose an optimal legal system that
attains ideal social welfare and hence individuals’ well-being, making everyone better off
before and after the fact of the accident, with optimal precautions to avoid unreasonable risks,
optimal insurance to compensate reasonable risks, progressive funding with optimal
redistribution of wealth, and mandatory aggregation of claims and defenses.

III. Explanatory View of the Defendant Class Action
A. The Antecedents of the Defendant Class Action
1. The English Courts of Chancery
In its roots, the representative suits were formed by a group or class of defendants in a
lawsuit. The legal action was brought by one plaintiff against some certain respondents acting
on behalf of the whole group, due to the common interests that united this designated class of
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persons and because of their large number that would make impracticable to order them all to
appear before the court.
The work of the chapter solicitor of Canterbury, C. R. Bunce, in the late 18th and early
19th centuries, to organize the dean and chapter’s muniments, by separating the documents
that concern the activities of the ecclesiastical courts of Canterbury, made possible to
acknowledge, in our days, the probable origin and time of the collective litigation, especially
the defendant class action.53
Master Martin Rector of Barkway c. Parishioners of Nuthampstead, the ancient name
for Martin v. Parishioners of Nuthampstead, is a dispute accepted to be the oldest group
litigation presently known.54
The case is dated circa 1.199 and involved some parishioners as respondents,
representing the whole group of parishioners, in a lawsuit brought by the rector of Barkway,
concerning his rights to tithes and obventions from the chapel and their correlative duties.55
As we realize the modern class action has its origins in the equity procedures of the
English Chancery courts, the bills of peace, where a plaintiff suited several defendants as a
class.56 57
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This is assertion is undisputed in time. See, Note, Action under the Codes Against Representative Defendants,
86 Harv. L. Rev. 89 (1922-1923); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Some Problems of Equity, 200 and 153-197 (University
of Michigan Law School 1950) (cited hereafter as Chafee, Some Problems of Equity); Comments, Defendant
Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 283, 286, (1985-1986); and, Manual for
Complex Litigation, Fourth, §21, 243 (2004).

In the Medieval era, defendant class actions were as frequent as plaintiffs’ ones.58
Today, it is said that the number of plaintiffs’ group litigation supersedes the number of
defendant class actions.59
The general rule was that the bill should contained all proper parties, unless justice
would be best served otherwise by a representative modus, as presented by an earlier
commentator:
“All persons interested must, in general, be parties to the suit, unless justice will be best
administered by entrusting the interest of numerous bodies to the protection of a few, or
of remote to near claimants”.60
57
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Three distinct circumstances authorized the representative litigation: a) when from the
number of persons some may act on behalf of the whole61; b) where claimants are remote62;
and, c) where necessary parties cannot be brought before the court.63
According to Basil Montagu the first group embraced, just like the case of Martin v.
Parishioners of Nuthampstead, suits concerning commoners and rights to tithes:
“A suit may be instituted by a lord of the manor against some of the tenants, or by some
of the tenants against the lord on a question of common”.64
Also belonged to the same category suits involving terre-tenants65; committees of
large bodies66; ship’s companies67; creditors, legatees and trustees68; and, large bodies in
nature of partnerships.
In Adair v. New River Company, a case involving a large body in nature of partnership
placing as respondents the New River Company and more than one hundred other persons, it
has been established:
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“The general rule, requiring all persons interested to be parties, dispensed with, where it
is impracticable, or, extremely difficult. In such a case, to obtain a decree, to establish
the right of suit to a mill, for instance, the Court only requires parties sufficient to
secure a fair contest; and, the right being established in that way, consequential relief
may he had against the rest in another suit”.69
Similarly, in Cockburn v. Thompson, a case concerning a bilateral aggregative
procedure, the bill was filed by several persons, on behalf of themselves and all others the
proprietors of a philanthropic institution, against Thompson and other bankers, the Lord
Chancellor [Eldon] ruled:
“The strict rule, that all persons, materially interested, must be parties, dispensed with,
where it is impracticable, or very inconvenient: as in the case of a very numerous
association in a joint concern; in effect a partnership. Defect of parties the subject of
Demurrer, or Plea; as it appears, or not, on the face of the Bill”70
The second set of cases, where claimants are remote, are related to contingent estates
and entails71, and lessees and mortgagees.72
The third and last group of the classification concerns to cases where necessary parties
cannot be brought before the court, especially when one is out of the jurisdiction of the
court.73
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Others commentators emphasize some different topics to classify the old English
collective procedures, nonetheless, without much of difference in substance.
For instance, James Wm. Moore affirms: “At an early date the class action was
recognized as proper in three situations: (1) where the number of interested persons was so
great that joinder was impracticable; (2) if joinder were effected, continued abatement by
death or otherwise would prevent a decree; and (3) where effective joinder of certain
interested persons was impossible because they were not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court”.74
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. points out: a) representation by rule of law; b) where there is a
large and indefinite number of persons; and, c) when the claim is by or against definite
persons who are very numerous, being this case, according to the author, the one closest to the
modern class suit.75
And, Joseph Story proposes: “The most usual cases arranging themselves under this
head of exceptions are, (1) where the question is one of a common or general interest, and one
or more sue, or defend for the benefit of the whole; (2) where the parties form a voluntary
association for public or private purposes, and those , who sue, or defend, may fairly be
presumed to represent the rights and interests of the whole; (3) where the parties are very
numerous, and although they have, or may have separate distinct interests; yet it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court”.76

2. The American Law and Jurisprudence
a) The Federal Equity Rule 48 (1842)
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5 Moore’s Federal Practice, §23 App. 100-20 (Matthew Bender, 3rd Ed.) (cite hereafter as 5 Moore’s Federal
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Chafee, Some Problems of Equity, 209-13 (cited on note 56).
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Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, §97, 109 (Gaunt Inc, 2001).

Following the English bills of peace, permitting a representative suit in exception to
the rule of compulsory joinder of all interested parties to an action, the United States adopted
the same sort of legal provision.
At this time it was ordinary to have representatives groups of litigants, either in the
defendants side or in the plaintiffs pole of the procedural relationship, hence, one single rule,
the Federal Equity Rule 38 of 1842, prescribe for plaintiffs’ and defendants’ class actions.77
The Equity Rule 48 depicted the collective litigation in one paragraph with two
sentences. The first one provided, in a very simple and straightforward manner, that whenever
the parties on either side (therefore, expressly adopting representative lawsuits either of
plaintiffs or defendants), were so numerous that all could not be brought before the court
without manifest inconvenience or oppressive delay in the suit, the court discretionarily could
order the suit to proceed with sufficient parties representing all the adverse interests of the
plaintiffs and the defendants.
However, the second sentence was incoherent with an aggregative procedure, because
it read: “[B]ut, in such cases, the decree shall be without prejudice to rights and claims of all
the absent parties”. It does not make sense authorizing a representative party to pursue claims
or presents defenses, on behalf of a whole class of persons, with similar interests, and at the
same time release them from the binding effect of the judgment.
The incongruous result would be that solely the representative parties of the plaintiffs
or of the defendants, or even, of both of them, would be bound by the ruling. Meanwhile the
other members of the classes would be able to go, indefinitely, arguing and defending the
common adverse interests. In each new lawsuit, the enforcement of the decision would only
be made upon the representative parties, and, once again, permitting a new class action to be
filed with different classes representatives.
Nevertheless, the literal interpretation of the provision had not been adopted by the
Supreme Court. In one of the first class action on the American jurisprudence, the case Smith
v. Swormstedt, Mr. Justice Nelson, delivering the opinion of the Court, ruled:
77

Equity Rule 48 (1842): “Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest
inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the Court in its discretion may dispense
with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all
the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But, in such cases, the
decree shall be without prejudice to rights and claims of all the absent parties”.

“An object was taken, on the argument, to the bill for want of proper parties to maintain
the suit. We think the objection not well founded. (…) For convenience, therefore, and
to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest
to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if all were
before court” (emphasis added).78
Therefore, the class action principle of some representing a crowd of persons, with the
same common interests, and the judgment binding the whole, had been preserved by the
Supreme Court interpretation of the Equity Rule 48.
b) The Federal Equity Rule 38 (1912)
The rule of representative actions with classes of defendants or plaintiffs was duly
incorporated into the statutes and, consequently, provided in the new equity Rule 38.
The successor of the equity rule of 1842, the equity Rule 38 of 1912, revoked the
clause concerning the nonbinding effect of the decision, and established two requirements for
the collective procedure: a common or general question and the impracticability to bring
before court all members of the class due its large number, as it reads:
Rule 38. When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons
constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.
Moreover, the federal equity rule had been integrated into the procedural code of many
states. Some of them used the same language requiring both requisites to the class action.79
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57 U.S. 288, 302 (1853).

For example, adopted this model the states of Colorado, Florida, Delaware, Connecticut, cf. Carl C. Wheaton,
Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 Cornell L. Q. 399, 400 (1933-1934). See also, Charles A.
Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and, Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, 3ed., §1751, 14-15,
(Thomson-West 2005), vol. 7A (cited hereafter as Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice); and discussing the
requisites for representative suits and its binding effects, William W. Blume, The “Common Questions”

Others used the disjunctive or admitting the class suit in equity, either if the class was
numerous or if there was a common interest.80 Anyhow, even in the latter cases, some courts
interpreted the rules as requiring the fulfillment of both requisites in order to allow the
collective suit to proceed.81
Under the provision in comment, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine
established in Smith v. Swormstedt, creating the leading case for the 20th century, concerning
the binding effect upon the absent parties in a class suit. Mr. Justice Day was emphatic, when
delivering the opinion of the Court in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, affirming that:
“If the federal courts are to have the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are
obviously entitled, the decree when rendered must bind all of the class properly
represented. The parties and the subject-matter are within the court's jurisdiction. It is
impossible to name all of the class as parties, where, as here, its membership is too
numerous to bring into court. The subject-matter included the control and disposition of
the funds of a beneficial organization and was properly cognizable in a court of equity.
The parties bringing the suit truly represented the interested class. If the decree is to be
effective and conflicting judgments are to be avoided all of the class must be concluded
by the decree”.82
In previous cases, the Supreme Court had had already given binding effect to all
members of a life insurance policy or of a fraternal benefit scheme represented in a collective

Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 878 (1931-1932); Chester B.
McLaughlin, The Mysteries of the Representative Suit, 26 Geo. L. J. 878 (1937-1938).
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See, Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, 15 (cited in note 79).
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255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921).

suit83, which are considered the precedents for the “limited fund” class actions, as cited in In
re Joint Eastern & Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 129 B.R. 710 (1991).84
Anyhow, consideration concerning adequate representation to produce res iudicata to
all members of a class is still the most intricate aspects of collectivized litigation, and it seems
not yet totally settled by the Supreme Court.85
c) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938) – Rule 23
In September 16th, 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective86,
producing a major alteration of the law, ceasing the equitable basis for the class actions, as the
federal statute merged the procedures in Law and Equity, establishing just one form of civil of
action, in the Rule 2.87
The Advisory Committee Notes of 1937 to the original Rule 23 stated that the new
rule was: “a substantial restatement of Equity Rule 38 (Representatives of Class) as that rule
has been construed. It applies to all actions, whether formerly denominated legal or
equitable”.88
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Of course it was already part of the History of Law the rigid proceedings of the old common law writs, similar
to the five legis actiones of the ancient Roman Law, where a de facto situation should strictly reproduce a writ,
otherwise the action could not be prosecuted.

In accordance to the legal tradition, the Rule 23 established that if the persons
constituting a class, of defendants or plaintiffs, or both, were so numerous to make it
impracticable to bring them all before court, one or more could represent the whole class.
Regarding the representation, the rule accentuated that conducting parties should fairly insure
the adequate representation of the absent parties.89
In addition, Rule 23 stipulated a classification of the collective suits, considering the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class. Hence, three different
types of class actions existed in the clauses (1), (2) and (3) of the Rule 23(a), and became to
be known, respectively, as “true”; “hybrid”; and, “spurious”- where the rights were several,
and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief
is sought.
The denomination of “true”, “hybrid” and “spurious” types of class actions is
attributed to Professor James Moore, and even though it is lengthy, we kindly ask to be
excused to reproduce his lesson explaining each and every one of them:
“Under original Rule 23(a) there were three types of class actions, all of which involved
a class of persons which was so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring all its
members before the court, so that a suit on behalf of or against the class could be
brought by or against one or more members of the class who would insure adequate
representation of the whole class. The distinction between the types of class suits under
original Rule 23(a) depended upon the jural relationship among the class members with
regard to the right sued upon. Thus subdivision (a)(1) of original Rule 23 dealt with the
true class suit which involved a class in which the right sought to be enforced by or
against the class was ''joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a
89

Rule 23. Class Actions.
“(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may,
on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and
a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property
involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is
sought”.

primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it.'' This class suit involved principles of compulsory joinder, since
had it not been for the numerosity of the class members all should have been before the
court. A judgment in a true class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, was
binding under res judicata principles upon all the members of the class, whether or not
they were before the court. It was the nondivisible nature of the right sued on which
determined both the membership of the class and the res judicata effect of the final
determination of the right.
Subdivision (a)(2) of original Rule 23 dealt with the hybrid class suit, which involved
situations in which the rights sought to be enforced by or against the class were several,
and the object of the action was the adjudication of claims affecting specific property. A
judgment under (a)(2) was binding under res judicata principles upon all the members
of the class, but only with regard to claims involving the specific property which it was
the object of the action to settle.
Subdivision (a)(3) of original Rule 23 dealt with the spurious class action, where the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class was several, and
there was a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common
relief was sought. The spurious class action was a permissive joinder device. Once a
spurious class action was brought, with a class of sufficient numerosity, by
representatives of the class who could adequately represent the interests of the class,
other members of the class were free to come forward and join the action. If they did
not do so, they were not bound, under principles of res judicata, by the outcome of the
action, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class. The spurious class action thus
provided a means for the adjudication in one lawsuit of a number of separate claims
involving common questions of law or fact where a common relief was sought”
(emphasis added).90
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5 Moore’s Federal Practice, §23 App. 101 (cited in note 76). For further explanation of Professor Moore’s
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At the outset, the rule had been well regarded as an endeavor to improve the use of
class actions91, but the practice evidenced otherwise, with courts facing unsurmountable
difficulties to distinguish the categories of rights to be enforced with the adjectives employed
of “joint”, “several” and “common”. Besides, it was very difficult to conform the cases into
the format of the types of the classes prescribed in Rule 23.92
Early commentators of the federal statute affirmed that: “Rule 23 then is not a rule at
all; at most it is a restatement of law somewhat comparable to the volumes of American Law
Institute, or better, a caveat therein”.93
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“Rule 23 as to class actions is simple and intelligible, which is more than can be said of any rule that I know of
heretofore promulgated either by statute or court rule”, Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. Va.
L. Q. 5, 16 (1938-1939). See, also, William VanDercreek, The “Is” and “Ought” of Class Action under Federal
Rule 23, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 273 (1962-1963).
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Extensive critique had been made by the Advisory Committee Note of 1966 to Revision of Rule 23:
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It was thought that the definitions accurately described the situations amenable to the class-suit device, and also
would indicate the proper extent of the judgment in each category, which would in turn help to determine the res
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assure procedural fairness, particularly giving notice to members of the class, which may in turn be related in
some instances to the extension of the judgment to the class”.

93
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A point to be noted is that the “spurious” class action, as above explained by Professor
Moore, adopted an opting-in system, i.e., in order to be bound by the decision, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the class, the members ought to come forward and join the
action.94
The Rule 23 in effect today stipulates two mandatory class action under subdivision
(b)(1) and subdivision (b)(2), and, one opting-out provision under subdivision (b)(3) as
established by the subdivision (c)(2).95 96
B. The Characteristic of the Defendant Class Action
1. Introduction
The use of defendant class action is ample and there is no legal restriction for its
application in any field of law. However, it is more frequent in lawsuits involving civil

Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81
Harv. L. Rev. 356, 380-6 (1967-1968); Richard L. Marcus & Edward F. Sherman, Complex Litigation, 210
(West Group 1998); Notes, Federal Class Actions: a Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 802,
818-836 (1946); Irving A. Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in Illinois 42
Ill L Rev 518, 518-533 (1947-1948); Arthur J. Keeffe, Stanley M. Levy and Richard P. Donovan, Lee Defeats
Ben Hur 33 Corn LQ 327(1947-1948); Note, Binding Effects of Class Actions, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 10591067 (1953-1954); Developments in the Law – Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
874, 928-943 (1957); Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 Buffalo L.
Rev. 433 (1959-1960); Joseph J. Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class Suits 60 Mich L Rev 905 (1961-1962).
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(cited in note 93). But, compare, Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, §1752, 30-42, (cited in note 79); Kalven
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rights97; disputes challenging constitutionality of state and local law and practices enforced by
public officials; suits against unincorporated associations, e.g., labor unions. But defendants’
classes have also been certified in other contexts, such as patent infringement; antitrust;
securities, and environmental.98
The multiple goals or principles of collective suits are applicable both to plaintiffs’
and defendants’ class actions: (i) access to justice; (ii) deterrence or policing behaviors; (iii)
equilibrium of the parties in litigation; (iv) judicial and process resources economy; and, (v)
avoidance of incompatible adjudication.
Without analyzing the defendants’ point of view, one commentator has enumerated
five advantages plaintiffs can gain with defendant class action: prosecution of low stakes
claims (goals of access to justice and parties equilibrium); tolling of the limitations period
against the whole class (goal of resources economy); prevention of collateral estoppel (goal of
resources economy); avoidance of incompatible decisions (goal of avoidance of incompatible
adjudication); and overcoming problems of personal jurisdiction and venue (goal of access to
justice).99
It is noteworthy that the advantages of the defendant class action are not limited to the
plaintiffs. The defendant class action is a collective device that is operational, functional,
favoring, indistinctively, authors or respondents in representative suits.
As a consequence, the augment of the law enforcement, by means of collective
litigation, might diminished or ceased, where there is the possibility of class members (either
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plaintiffs or defendants) to exit from the lawsuit. This happens with the mechanism of optingout provided for classes certified under the rule 23(b)(3).
Even though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has disciplined solely in Rule 23 the
procedure for either plaintiff or defendant class actions, they can not be treated identically as
one being the mirror-image of the other one.100 There are many specifics that differ from each
other’s angle.
Rule 23, in its current version, is much more elaborated than the past statutory ruel
concerning representative suits in the United States.
A variety of details of the class action procedure and its effects is established in the
Rule 23, in eight subdivisions (including those related to the requisites - 23(a), and, the types 23(b), of the class actions).
The subdivision 23(c) disciplines the timing and the elements for the class certification
order; the appropriateness of notice and its contents; and, the judgments’ effect; subdivision
23(d) is concerned with the orders in conduct of the actions; subdivision 23(e) is related to
settlement, voluntary dismissal, and compromise; 23(f) deals with appeals; subdivision 23(g)
provides for class counsel101; and, finally, subdivision 23(g) is about attorney fees award.102
The provisions that define the requisites for certification and maintenance of a class
action are stated in subdivision 23(a) and 23(b). In the following items, we are going to
concisely scrutinize the referred rules under the standpoint of a defendant class action.
a) Rule 23(a) Prerequisites for Certification of the Class Action.
The 1966 Amendment to the Rule 23, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures,
rewrote completely the rule in order to overcome major difficulties courts and commentators
have realized in regard to the original version of 1938.
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The Advisory Committee Note of 1966 Revision of the Rule 23 made a profound
critique to the 1938 Rule 23103, and pointed out that the amended rule is “described in more
practical terms the occasions for maintaining class actions”.
Rule 23(a) establishes four prerequisites to every class action, either plaintiffs’ or
defendants’: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and, adequate representation.104
Concerning the firs requisite, the test stipulated by the statute is the impracticability of
joinder of the whole members of the class due to its numerousness. There is not a minimum
number of people which over that the class action procedure is authorized, once
impracticability is not impossibility of joinder.105 The circumstances surrounding the case
have to be examined in order to check the fulfillment of the numerosity requirement.106
Although the number of the putative class is the primordial factor to certify a class
action in relation to the numerosity requirement, one commentator has pointed out that a court
shall considered for the impracticability of joinder other elements, such as: (i) judicial
economy arising from avoiding multiple actions; (ii) the geographic dispersion of the class
members; (iii) the financial resources of the class members; (iv) the claimants’ ability to
institute individual suits (in plaintiff’s actions), and, we add, the defendants’ ability to
individually defend themselves; and, (v) requests for prospective and injunctive relief that
could affect future class members.107
The standard is applied more flexibly to defendant class actions than plaintiffs’ one by
reason of enhancing the collective litigation goal of judicial resources economy. It is more
103
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likely that many individuals’ lawsuits may be brought in case of denial of certification of a
defendant class, than it would occur with a plaintiff class action. In the latter case, just one or
a few plaintiffs shall resort to an individual suit, after the class certification has been
denied.108
The second prerequisite of the Rule 23(a) is commonality of questions of law or fact to
the class. Despite of the fact that the provision is in plural - “questions” - the objective of it is
to obtain efficiency by collective adjudication and to protect absentees’ interests by solving, at
least one, relevant nuclear question of law or fact.109
Courts have not had much difficulty in asserting the commonality requirement110, but
rather have given it a cursory treatment because it figures to be superfluous or overlapped by
other provisions of Rule 23(a) and (b).111
Moreover, the Supreme Court, in the case General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,
has stated that commonality and typicality tend to merge together, and also with the requisite
of adequate representation.112
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The common questions of law or fact in a defendant class action may emerge out of
the context, for example, of a suit challenging the constitutionality of a statute enforced by
several public officials. The constitutionality of the legal rule gives rise to an identical
defense for all the class of public law enforcers.
Typicality is the third prerequisite to a class action and, according to the Supreme
Court interpretation, tends to merger with commonality and adequate representation.
The optimal exam of the presence of this requisite is performed by the verification
of the defense of the proposed class representative and the absence of conflictual interests
with the class members. Further, the defenses for all class members should be grounded in
the same legal theory.113
In addition, a defense would lack typicality if it could only be applied to the class’
representative. Therefore, the defense shall be considered typical if it protects the interests
of the putative members of the class, notwithstanding, “typicality does not require that the
defenses be identical or perfectly coextensive; substantial similarity is sufficient” (cf.
Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exchange Association of Illinois, 97 F.R.D. 668, 678
- 1983).
Another test for typicality is the so-called “juridical link” doctrine, emerged from
the case La Mar v. H& B Novelty & Loan Co., positing that where the defendants are
“juridically related in a manner that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would be
expeditious” the class action procedure should be applied.114
The La Mar decision denied certification of a bilateral class action because the
representative plaintiff has had relationship with only one defendant, and so he did not
have cause of action against all the other defendants. Therefore, there was lack of typicality
of claims.
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In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court asserted: “In brief, typicality is lacking when
the representative plaintiff's cause of action is against a defendant unrelated to the
defendants against whom the cause of action of the members of the class lies”.115
The exceptions to the above explained theory, in accordance to the La Mar court,
would be those “(…) in which all injuries are the result of a conspiracy or concerted
schemes between the defendants at whose hands the class suffered injury”.116 Besides the
existence of a conspiracy or a concerted scheme, other exception, as pointed out, is the
presence of the “juridical link”.117
Although it may be considered that the juridical link test establishes a higher
standard of typicality, it is useful in the definition of the scope of a defendant class, and to
protect the absent members by means of presenting typical defenses to the whole class.118
The fourth prerequisite for certification of any class action is that “the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”.
The adequacy of representation is the most complex prerequisite and reveals the basis
of the collective litigation, e.g., one or more persons litigating in the name of a crowd.119
Accordingly, it is consistent with the due process of law clause, by which an
individual can not be bound by a judgment where he was not a party to, or, had had an
opportunity to intervene.120
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In a plaintiff class actions context, the Supreme Court has established that due process
of law is observed when the interests of the class are duly represented by the named party:
“It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of a class not present as
parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately
represented by parties who are present, or where they actually participate in the conduct
of the litigation in which members of the class are present as parties, or where the
interest of the members of the class, some of whom are present as parties, is joint, or
where for any other reason the relationship between the parties present and those who
are absent is such as legally to entitle the former to stand in judgment for the latter. In
all such cases, so far as it can be said that the members of the class who are present are,
by generally recognized rules of law, entitled to stand in judgment for those who are
not, we may assume for present purposes that such procedure affords a protection to the
parties who are represented, though absent, which would satisfy the requirements of due
process and full faith and credit”.121 (emphasis added and citations omitted)
Particular questions concerning the adequate representative in defendant class actions,
originate special analysis and “closer scrutiny” in order to ascertain if the named parties can
actually protect, fairly and adequately, the interests of the entire class.122
There are three foremost concerns related to the choice of adequate representative in
defendant class actions: (i) the choice of the representative is made by the plaintiff; (ii) the
absence of incentive for any defendant to bare the expenses of defending a lawsuit on behalf
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of the entire class when the costs of litigation are disproportionate to the representative party’s
stake; (iii) the difficulty to compensate class counsel for the benefits conferred upon the class.
It is very well known the phrase of Professor Chaffee Jr. that: “It is a strange situation
where one side picks out the generals for the enemy’s army”, implying that the plaintiff would
select a weak representative for the defendant class.123
However, the plaintiff’s choice of an incapable class representative shall be challenged
by any absent members, fact that would jeopardize a favorable adjudication to the plaintiff.124
Likewise, the court has a broad power to conduct the action (Rule 23(d)) in order to
maintain the class action procedure “fair and efficient”, as affirmed in the Advisory
Committee Notes.
Hence, the court may replace the class representative in circumstances where he does
not prosecute vigorously the class defense, or, has a conduct in conflict with the class
interests. Also, the court may permit intervention of a new representative in addition to the
current one, or, just designate another person to represent the class.
Similarly to the appointment of an interim class counsel (Rule 23(g)(2)(A)), the same
procedure may be adopted in relation to the class representative, moreover, in defendant class
actions where the indication had been made by the plaintiff.125
The other two problems involve directly the incentives for the class attorney to assume
the lawsuit. Only economy of scale in investment in the lawsuit can overcome the problem of
the reluctance of defendants to assume the litigation as class representative. This objective is
achieved with incentives for the class counsel through an optimal mechanism of
compensation for his performance.126
b) Rule 23(b) Maintenance of the Class Action.

123

Chafee, Some Problems of Equity, 237 (cited on note 56).

124

See, Wolfson, 38 Ohio St. L. J. 459, 478-82 (cited in note 98).

125

Cf. MCL, 4th, §21.26, 277. See, In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, 172 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio – 1997);
Shankroff v. Advest, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 190 (S.D. N.Y. – 1986).
126

See, Part IV, A and D, infra.

The prerequisites of the Rule 23(a) are a necessary condition to each and every class
action, either of plaintiffs’ or defendants’, or, even bilateral suit, but they are not a sufficient
condition to the maintenance of a collective litigation.
In this section we are going to focus on the additional elements described in Rule
23(b), that have to be fulfilled for the use of the defendant class action, and which give rise to
distinct types of class actions, on account of diverse objectives of each one.127
Defendant class actions have been certified under all the subdivisions of Rule 23(b). It
is noteworthy that, recently, one commentator has stressed out the lack of solid doctrinal
bases for class action categories specified in Rule 23(b), blurring them together and
promoting its manipulation by litigants and courts.128
The class actions regulated in subdivisions 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) are considered to be
mandatory, that is, every member of the class shall be bound by the judgment. Consequently,
there is no option to the class members to be excluded from the lawsuit.
The rationale is to avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments in relation to the parties,
creating incompatible standards of conducts, or, the possibility of impairment or impediment
to some of the class members to exercise or protect their interest, should individuals’ lawsuits
be filed.
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For this exactly reason, Professor Kaplan has denominated as “natural” or
“necessary”, classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2).129 It is necessary or natural that
people in equal circumstances should be treated equally. Otherwise, the principle of justice
and the courts themselves would be disrespected. Those elements, in certain way, describe the
provisions for necessary joinder of parties stated in Rule 19, of the Fed. Rule of Civ. P.130
The avoidance of incompatible adjudication of rights, among individuals placed in the
same situation, is one of the goals of the class actions.
Defendant class actions have been certified in both subdivisions 23(b)(1)(A) and
23(b)(1)(B).
Certification of defendant classes under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is made in order to impose a
compatible pattern of conduct to the to the plaintiff in relation to the defendants.
The objective of the provision is to try to avoid inconsistent or varying adjudications
with respect to individual defendant. The reason is that multiple lawsuits, instead of one
collective procedure, would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class (that means, to the plaintiff).
The functional utility of 23(b)(1)(A) defendant class actions has been remarked in
patent infringement cases, due offensive collateral estoppel doctrine conceived by the
Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc., v. University of Illinois Foundation.131
In such a case, the judicial decree of invalidity of a patent could be used as collateral estoppel
against the original plaintiff in any other future suit.132
Anyhow, some authorities have decided that there is not an incompatible standard of
conduct if a “plaintiff patent-holder may be required to act differently with respect to different
parties if the validity of its patent is upheld in one case and rejected in another, the plaintiff
would not be subjected to incompatible standards of conduct. Incompatibility would exist
129
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only if one court order permitted the enforcement of the patent against an alleged infringer
and another court order prohibited the enforcement of the patent against that same alleged
infringer. The party opposing the class would not have to violate one judgment in order to
satisfy another judgment”.133
It seems that this interpretation is in conflict with the express provision of the statutes,
and also its goal, notwithstanding, being illogical. The legal rule is based on the logic law of
the excluded middle (tertium non datur): either the patent is valid and enforceable against
everyone, or, it is invalid and unenforceable to everybody; there is not a third option. This is
the reason that the subject matter “necessarily” has to be decided in a homogenous way to the
whole class of alleged patent infringer. The incompatible standard of conduct to the plaintiff
would occur if, at the same time, the patent could be enforced and could not be enforced.
Defendant class actions have also have been certified, under the subdivision
23(b)(1)(A), in securities litigation context.134
The Rule 23(b)(1)(B) contemplates defendant class actions because the prosecution of
separate actions against individual members, while not technically concluding the other
members, might do so as a practical matter. Here, there is not a risk of inconsistent
adjudications due to separate suits; rather, without the class action procedure, absent class
members shall have their interests impaired or impeded.
The Advisory Committee Note has expressly affirmed the utilization of class actions
by or against representative members, under the theory of “limited fund”: “In various
situations an adjudication as to one or more members of the class will necessarily or probably
have an adverse practical effect on the interests of other members who should therefore be
represented in the lawsuit. This is plainly the case when claims are made by numerous
persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims. A class action by or against
representative members to settle the validity of the claims as a whole, or in groups, followed
133
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by separate proof of the amount of each valid claim and proportionate distribution of the fund,
meets the problem”.
Nonetheless, defendant classes have been certified in “limited fund” cases in very
special circumstances, once it is rare that defendants are seeking money from a fund as it is
usual to plaintiff classes.
The first one concerns interpleader defendant classes where, for example, the plaintiff
seeks to distribute funds from trust to the defendants.135 The second situation is related to a
“common fund” from insurance policies for professional liability. Here, separate lawsuits
against the partners may drains the common policy, making those that are prosecuted in the
future to bare their own court’s adjudication and litigation costs.136
In another circumstance, courts have certified defendants classes, based on Rule
23(b)(1)(B), in litigations concerning property rights.137
Rule 23(b)(2) primary concern is with the type of relief sought. The intention is to
provide final injunctive or declaratory relief as the rule states: “the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class
as a whole”.
The Advisory Committee Notes explained that the subdivision is not intended to cases
where the plaintiff is, “exclusively or predominantly”, seeking money damages.
Some courts have interpreted literally the Rule 23(b)(2), asserting that “the party
opposing the class” should be understand as the defendant opposing the plaintiffs’ class,
hence precluding defendant class actions.138
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This construction is not in accordance to the provision of Rule 23, where in many
subdivisions expressly prescribe for both plaintiff and defendant, such as: 23(a); 23(a)(3);
23(b)(1); 23(b)(3); and, 23(d).
Some commentators have considered “party” as the plaintiff’s class, collectively, in
the context of bilateral civil rights litigation.139 Another has argued that the useful approach to
certified defendant class actions is to employ the “juridical link test”.140 It seems correct that
the singular reference to “party” in Rule 23 should normally be construed as also including
the plural unless expressly provided in the contrary.141
The most relevant domain of law that defendant class actions have been certified,
under Rule 23(b)(2), is pertaining to civil rights.142 But there are cases involving housing or
property rights143, government benefits144, and sex discrimination145.
The 23(b)(3) class action principal difference from the preceding ones is the
mechanism for members of the class to opt out of the litigation, obviating the binding effect
of the aggregate judgment. Therefore, it is said this type of class actions “is not particularly
suited to defendant classes, because members of Rule 23(b)(3) classes have the right to opt
out of a class judgment”.146
Notwithstanding, defendant class actions have been certified under Rule 23(b)(3).147
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In this sense, evidence that opting out of a defendant class action would make
everyone worse off (members that opt-out; members that stay in, and, plaintiffs), has been
produced throughout this work.
The Advisory Committee Note asserted that the last type of class action prescribed in
the Rule 23(b)(3) “encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies
of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly
situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results”.
A defendant class action should be maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), if common
questions predominate over the questions affecting individual members, and the collective
procedure is superior than any other methods to deal with the case, so that it ought to confer
“fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”.148

IV. The Optimal Aggregation of Defendants
A. Exploiting Investment and Economy Scales in the Aggregation of Defenses
As we have argued, optimal law enforcement system to confer individuals’ ideal wellbeing is only achieved by aggregation of claims and defenses.
It is true that separate litigation, i.e., case-by-case litigation, precludes economy of
scale for the plaintiffs, undermining deterrence and compensation functions of the law. Only
mandatory aggregation of claims breaks the asymmetric advantage that defendants have over
plaintiffs, which skews adjudication in favor of the former.149
Also, the lack of aggregation of defendants precludes the plaintiff, in a single class
action, to obtain adjudication of liability against several wrongdoers, for instance, in case of
various environmental polluters firms.
So far, the advantages of defendant class action are not limited to the plaintiffs bar. It
is our understanding that the defendant class action is operational, functional, either for
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plaintiffs or defendants. The same phenomenon that affects plaintiffs, in most of the mass tort
litigation, where a defective design of a product or service, provided by a firm, affect
innumerous victims, may be present within a dispersed class of defendants threatened with
nuisance value suits by one or more plaintiffs.
Alba Conte and Herbert Newberg have challenged the general assertion that
Rule23(b)(3) is unsuitable to defendant class actions, because the high probability of
numerous members opting out of the class:
“In fact, some circumstances will actually create incentives not to opt out of a defendant
class. For example, a plaintiff who commences a defendant class against a group of
underwriters of a new stock offering may also threaten and be able to commence
litigation against each of the underwriters individually. Given the certainty of having to
make a choice between remaining in a defendant class or defending individual
litigation, the economics of a joint defense considerably outweigh those of defending an
individual action, and defendant class members would have an incentive to remain in
the class”.150
Despite of the validity of the argument, our proposal moves further urging that the
optimal economy of scale for investment in litigation requires the compulsory reunion of the
defendants and their defenses.151
It is a general consensus that the primary advantage of class actions is to override the
transactional cost of low stakes claims, which would not be individually prosecuted because
the costs of litigation (process and judicial expenses and attorney’s fees) supersede the
expected utility from the adjudication.152
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Nevertheless, there are some criticisms against this position asserting that, instead of
promoting judicial and process economy, class action increases litigation. Various arguments
shall evidence to the contrary.
The first refusal arises from the lack of parameter of comparison and thus statistics to
justify the assertion that the level of filing suits increments due to class actions, in detriment
of promoting economy of judicial resources.153
In addition, the deterrent effect of the law multiplies with the amplified probability of
filing a lawsuit. Consequently, there is a decrescent number of individuals engaging in the
violation of the law, that would give rise to potential lawsuits.154
Secondly, the critique passes by the fact that collective litigation of low stakes claims,
operates the deterrent function of the law, besides compensation.155 Wrongdoers will not take
appropriate steps to prevent harm if they are aware that, due to transactional costs, it is unlike
that the victims will bring lawsuits against them. This situation evidences that,
notwithstanding the size of the stake of the claim, the absence of vindication produces an
under-deterrence effect.
Thirdly, and the most important reasoning is that this argument seems to be eluding
that judicial economy is just one of the principles that guides collective litigation.
Although class action has at one time multiples goals: equilibrate the parties in
litigation; access to justice; deterrence or policing behaviors; and, avoidance of incompatible
adjudication, in some situations, an order of priority has to be established.
That does not mean that the other goals are to be unconsidered. The goals of
aggregation of claims and defenses are principles that north the enhancement of the law,
therefore, all have the same strength or status, and no one shall eliminate the other. However,
in some circumstances, one goal has to bestow prominence to another.
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If there is a conflict within the goals of the collective litigation the preference for an
optimal law enforcement system must select which one should prevail: in our view the access
to justice takes primacy, preponderating over judicial economy.156
In relation to high stake claims, it is argued the importance of allowing class members
to opt-out of the lawsuit certified under the Rule 23(b)(3). By definition, high stake claims are
those that would be individually viable, albeit the existence of class action procedures.
This line of reasoning follows the “anti-redistribution principle” (expression created
by Professor Rosenberg), that has been established by the Supreme Court in Amchem v.
Windsor157, which “determines the “fairness” of using Rule 23(b)(3) to resolve claims by trial
or settlement”.158
Briefly, the “fairness test” requires that class members recoveries, with high stake
claims, should reflect their expected value claims, under the separate action market, therefore,
justifying the opting-out of the class.159
Anyhow, the marketability of a claim in a separate action, instead of in a collective
procedure, takes into consideration, others, and more important, factors, as litigation costs,
and, litigation risks, both measured in accordance to types and difficulty of proof; complexity
of the law; the facts and related public policies etc.160
At this point is important to remember that allowing individuals to alter to ex post
preferences, that are diametrical opposite and mutually exclusive to their previous choices ex
ante, disrupts the optimal legal system for law enforcement, undermining the deterrence
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objective of collective adjudication and increasing litigation costs and risks, and, does not
provide any increased benefits for compensation.161
Other aspect of transactional costs of litigation that commentators have given very
little attention, or even better, its total lack of analysis, is of aggregation of low stakes
defenses.
The deficiency of fully exploiting investment and economy scales in litigation, due to
fractional aggregation is not an event that exclusively plaintiff’s incur.
Even in a situation of dispersed plaintiffs, filing multiple individual lawsuits, the
absence of mast tying as in mandatory class action, impedes the defendant to maximize his
economy and investment in litigation.162
In certain circumstances, the defendant can invest once and for all, as preparing
experts’ opinions or depositions. However, in others, several and overlapping lawsuits may
provoke a substantial increment of coordination costs. This augment is a result of the
managing costs for several actions, throughout different jurisdictions, employing different
lawyers or law firms, with varied experts, incurring in increased expenses with transportation
and accommodations for witnesses etc.163
Moreover, the situation is more acute when there are innumerous dispersed
defendants, with common defenses, either facing a plaintiff class action or multiple individual
lawsuits. Mandatory aggregation of defendants confers optimal scale of investment and
economy with optimal incentives to class representative as well as the class counsel.
Any violation or abuse of the law has to be rectified, and the value of adjudication
functions either in favor of prospective plaintiffs or of defendants.164
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In an optimal law enforcement system, it is not socially and individually desirable that
claims or defenses are not vindicated for the sole reason of litigation transactional costs,
which makes economically unviable to file a lawsuit or to present a legal defense.165
Ideal welfare to individuals is obtained with economy of scale in investment in
litigation. Aggregation of claims and defenses confers the ideal investment either for plaintiffs
or defendants, in collectivized procedures. It is irrelevant the dimension of the claims at stake:
either low or high. Further, it is functional indifferent if the lawsuit concerns to a class of
plaintiffs or defendants, or both. Even more, it is operational meaningless, for the best law
enforcement, if the purpose of the certification of a defendant class action serves the interests
of the plaintiffs or of the defendants.166
B. Nuisance Value Suits
The defendant class action is more frequently used as a procedural device for the
plaintiffs. However, it is a strong instrument to avoid nuisance value lawsuits to be used by
defendants, creating a class action in individual lawsuits brought by plaintiffs.
Nuisance value suits, or negative value suits, may be put into a model design described
as a lawsuit where the expected benefits of litigation would be outweighed by its costs.167
Further, it is a model of litigation where there is a presumptively small cost for the
plaintiff to bring the suit, and a relatively high cost for the defendant to defend himself.168
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Id., 422. See, also, Randy J. Kozel and David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Settlement Problem:
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1849, (2004) (defining nuisance-value settlement as “a payoff
extracted by a threat to litigate meritless claim or defense that both parties know the court would readily dismiss
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for summary judgment”, and, proposing a mandatory summary judgment to resolve it).

So, in a lawsuit characterized as a nuisance value suit, the plaintiff will likely file the
action, but unlikely will go to trial, and, the defendant will probably settle for any amount
inferior to his costs to present a defense.
The situation is better illustrated with numeric examples, furnished by David
Rosenberg and Steven Shavell.169
Imagine, for example number one, a plaintiff that has a low expected utility from a
judgment corresponding to 1% of $1,000. His cost to file a lawsuit is only $30 and an
additional cost of $150 if he goes to trial. On the other side, the defendant would bear a $200
to present his defense.
As we have sketched the case, the plaintiff is willing to file the lawsuit as its cost is
very low. In doing so, the defendant is facing an expense of $200 to defend himself.
Therefore, he is willing to settle for any amount bellow his litigation costs.
The outcome is the defendant settling with the plaintiff in order to avoid the cost of the
defense. He realizes an expected utility from settlement in comparison to higher costs of
litigating the case.
The plaintiff is also looking for a settlement, as he is unwilling to go to trial because
the case is weak and the cost of trial ($150) supersedes the adjudication of the judgment (1%
of $1,000 = 10). The filling expenses are a sunk cost that he does not care anymore at this
phase of the procedure.170 We are assuming that the plaintiff is risk-neutral or risk-averse, but
not a bluffer to try to risk a chance of the defendant choosing to litigate instead of settling. In
this case, the amount for settling has to be one that gives the plaintiff certainty that the
defendant will agree with, so the value has to be any value inferior to $200. Also, it is
irrelevant for the settlement if the defendant has information about the strength of the
plaintiff’s case, considering that the amount for settlement is going to be less than the defense
cost.
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Any other conduct of the parties would be irrational. If the defendant does not settle
nor appears in court to defend himself, he will loose of $1,000 by a default judgment. If the
defendant litigates, he would bear a cost of $200, instead of a settlement agreement for any
amount below this. The plaintiff, on the other hand, would probably withdraw the case and
avoid spending more $150 at trial for an expected judgment of only $10.
We emphasize that the mere threat of filling a lawsuit is enough to obtain the
settlement, because the threat is verisimilar under an economic analysis, hence making the
plaintiff eager to bring the action in case an out-of-court settlement is not reached.
Assume another example, where the plaintiff has a high expected utility from the
judgment, corresponding to 70% of $300, with a trial cost of $250. The costs for filling the
suit and the defense remain the same, respectively, $30 and $200. There is no qualitatively
difference from the first example, because the defendant would settle for any value inferior to
the amount of his litigation costs ($200). On the plaintiff’s side, he would be willing to file
the suit if he does not get an out-of-court settlement (costs of only $25). But also, he does not
want to go to trial even possessing a merit case, once the trial costs ($250) overcome the
expected adjudication of $210 (70% of $300 = $210).
According to the adopted definition, situations where the plaintiff has a merit case,
with high expectation from the judgment that overrides the costs of litigation, making him
eager to go to trial, would not be considered a nuisance value suit.171
The above assertions were made focused in the individual lawsuits. On cases where
there are innumerous and dispersed defendants, there is a major incentive for the
collectivization of the defenses, in order to achieve economy of scale to invest in the litigation
instead of settle in a negative value suit.
Assume that a plaintiff is suing or threatening to sue 100 people to obtain nuisancevalue settlements. Suppose these figures for each individual litigation: (i) $500 - costs to file
each suit; (ii) $1,500 – trial costs; (iii) $4,000 – defense costs; (iv) $2,000 – plaintiff’s offer to
settle; (v) 1% of 100,000 = $1,000 - expected judgment.
As we have argued, any single defendant would rather settle than litigate, even though
the plaintiff has a weak or meritless case. Anyhow, aggregating all defendants, considering
171
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that the above numbers maintained unchanged, the cost per-defendant is $40, what incentives
the defendants not to settle, but rather litigate.
Regardless of the fact that defendant class actions are more frequently used for
plaintiffs, and on their own interests, the goals of collective litigation – access to justice,
equilibrium within the parties in litigation; deterrence or policing behaviors; and, avoidance of
incompatible adjudication - are also achieved by the defendants’ requirement for aggregation
of the their class.
In Otero v. New York City House Authority, the district court filed an order permitting
the intervention of 171 defendants, that moved for a defendant class action, which was
certificate due impracticability of joinder, common questions at law, and, typicality of
claims.172
This precedent evidences, although rare, that a defendant is allowed to move for
certification of a class, which should reach optimal economy of scale in litigation by
forbidding members to opt-out of the class.173
Alternatively, the defendants may step upfront and file, with the exactly same
advantages, a class action for declaratory and or injunctive relieves.
For example in the DirecTV case174, a class of consumers filed a class action lawsuit
against DirecTV, claiming that the satellite television provider violated the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1961-1968, by mailing
demand letters that accused plaintiffs of illegally accessing the provider's signal. The U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the action on the basis that the
provider's sending of the letters was conduct immunized from RICO liability under the NoerrPennington doctrine. In upholding the trial court's judgment, the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that RICO and the predicate statutes at issue did not permit the
maintenance of a lawsuit for the sending of a prelitigation demand to settle legal claims that
did not amount to a sham. Because the demand letters at issue sought settlement of claims
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against plaintiffs under the Federal Communications Act, and no sham was claimed, they
could not form the basis of liability under RICO).175
A different use of defendant class action was employed in Georgia Power Co. v.
Hudson176, where the plaintiff, a public service company that operated a power dam, filed a
suit to enjoin the prosecution by defendants, owner of lands lying along the river below the
dam, of a number of actions for damages based on the plaintiff’s operation of the dam
overflowing bottom lands, instituted by the defendants against the plaintiff in several state
courts.177 In a certain manner, the objective was to consolidate all the land owners’ actions
brought in state courts into a federal court, what even up today is not possible.178
Completely diverse from our line of argumentation, concerning the aggregation of
defendants and their common defenses, it is the possibility that a single defendant, in a
plaintiff class action, file a counterclaim creating a defendant class action (or more precisely a
bilateral class action). The counterclaim, as is the proper name of the institute indicates, is a
“pleading which sets forth a claim for relief” (Rule 8(a), Fed. R. of Civ. P.), which discipline
is established in Rule 13, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.179
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Under the procedural angle, the defendant class action initiated by requirement of a
defendant follows the same pattern of any class action concerning the requisites of Rule 23(a)
and Rule 23(b).180
The key element is the mandatory aggregation of defendants, that would halve the
asymmetric advantage of plaintiff’s litigation, conferring the defendants scale advantage in
economy and investment, what would result in marketable defense, incentivizing class
counsel to assume the defense.
C. The Individuals’ Well-Being and the “Fairness” of a Day in Court
There is an idea scattered spread amongst legal operators that collectivized litigation
and individuals’ rights in conducting a civil action comprehend antagonist concepts.
Corresponding to this belief, the Supreme Court established that the parties, in
mandatory class actions, carry the burden to justify the exception to the individuals’ fairness
of having a day in court, which is a “deep-rooted historic tradition”:
“ ‘Second, and no less important, mandatory class actions aggregating damages claims
implicate the due process “principle of general application in Anglo-American
jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which
he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process”, Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40, 85 L. Ed. 22, 61 S. Ct. 115 (1940), it being
“our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court’ ”
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762, 104 L. Ed. 2d 835, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (9189) (quoting
18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449, p. 417
(1981)); see Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798-799, 135 L. Ed. 2d 76,
116 S. Ct. 1761 (1996). Although “we have recognized an exception to the general rule
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when, in certain limited circumstances, a person, although not a party, has his interests
adequately represented by someone with the same interests who is a party,” or “where a
special remedial scheme exists expressly foreclosing successive litigation by
nonlitigants, as for example in bankruptcy or probate,” Martin, supra, at 762, n. 2
(citations omitted), the burden of justification rests on the exception”.181
Correspondently, as the argument goes, individuals should have the right to opt-out of
class actions and individually litigate their claims and defenses.
Rhetorical as it is this “historical tradition” of an individual right of a day in court182,
one commentator has even gone further affirming that the day in court is based on “natural
law”:
“Underlying our tradition of individual claim autonomy in substantial tort cases is the
natural law notion that this is an important personal right of the individual”.183
Another scholar, while criticizing the “natural and inalienable” right of individual
conduction of process in contrast to collectivized procedure, as “somewhat embarrassing”,
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still purports the “popular presupposition of individual dignity, and its political counterpart,
self-determination”.184
The assertion that the “first purpose of our civil justice system is and should be to offer
corrective justice in disputes arising between private parties”185 fails to consider that any law
provision should enhance two functions, in this order: deterrence and compensation. As a
result, an optimal legal system should favor deterrence of unreasonable risks and
compensation solely for reasonable risks.186
Even the argument that “our system operates mainly on the assumption that economic
decisions are best made by the true owner of property rather than by any other person”187,
supposedly an economic one, does not suffice. The economics decisions, in modern society,
are made by experts in managing individuals’ assets, such as it happens in corporations,
governments, trade unions, investment funds, companies foundations’ funds, life insurance
policies etc, as noted by Professor Craig Jones.188
Of significant importance is the fact that, in most of the tort law cases, lawyers assume
the risks of litigation, evidenced by contingent fees. Statistics demonstrate that 90% of tort
litigation, individual or collectivized, are governed by contingent attorney fees’ agreements.189
Litigation strategies under contingent fees arrangements are made on the lawyer’s
assessment of expected gains and losses, hence, he will only bring a suit if the expected value
to him is positive.190
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Rules for Class Action, J. Legal Stud. 155, 166 (1981). The commentators propose nine different rules for
attorney’s fees with varieties between American rule (no shifting of litigation costs) and English rule (litigation

The contingent fees compensates the lawyers’ legal services and the loan of such
services, with a higher risk of default than ordinary market loan, remaining in cases for many
years outstanding without any interest and to be repaid only and if the lawsuit is successful.
Of course, these facts make the lawyers very careful in analyzing the expected value of the
judgment.191
Even if it is true the contention that contingent fees produce a differential interest
among class and class attorney (we do not consider a ‘conflict of interest’, because both are
seeking to maximize the expected utility from the claims or defenses, according to respective
position in litigation), the attorney stake in a class action is many times superior than in an
individual lawsuit, what makes him invest optimally, approximating or equalizing the
investment parties would do, if they were to finance their own litigation.192
The individuals’ welfare are duly protected by aggregation of claims and defenses
regardless of a personal day in court. This assertion is based in the rational choice theory.
Assuming that individuals are rational, seeking their optimal well-being, this is achieved by
an ideal legal system through optimal precautionary measures, insurance protection, and
progressive funding thereto. In addition, the model prohibits individual’s self exclusion of the
system, or, conducts in conflict with the system.193
Positing aggregation of claims and defenses and the right of “a day in the court” as
mutually exclusive, the assertion resembles a narrow view of the law enforcement device
provided by class actions.
D. Appropriate Incentives for Class Counsel
1. The 2003 Amendment to the Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

costs shifting), and, in five of them where there is a contingent fees, the lawyers take the risks of litigation and
make the decision of filing the lawsuit (Id., 163-6).
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In 2002, the United States Judicial Conference adopted the proposed amendments to
Rule 23, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made by the Advisory Committee of the
Civil Rules, after more than one decade of studies.194
It is the most comprehensive modification of the discipline of the class actions, since
the 1966 Amendments.195
The modifications are concentrated in four major areas.196 Before analyzing the new
subdivisions 23(g) and (h), which concerns the appointment of the class counsel and the
attorney fees award, that are the object of our proposal, it seems appropriate to make a brief
comment of the previous three.
The first one considers the timing of the class certification decision under subdivision
23(c)(1), establishing that the court’s decision whether to certify a class has to be “at an early
practicable time”, instead of the previous expression “as soon as practicable after
commencement of an action”.197 Also, the certification decision is not anymore “conditional”,
and it may be altered or amended before “final judgment”, instead of the “decision on the
merits”.198

194

See, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, News Release, Judicial Conference Judgeship
Recommendations endorsed by Administration 2 (Sept 24, 2002) available online at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/judconf902.pdf (last visited on April 27, 2006).

195

See, Mullenix, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 177, 177-8 (cited in note 128).

196

Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, §1753.1, 53-4, (cited in note 79).

197

According to the Manual of Complex Litigation, the ‘early practical time’ is considered the moment when the
court has sufficient information to decide whether the action meets the certification criteria of Rules 23(a) and
(b),MCL 4th, §21.133, 252-3. In addition, is important to observe the Notes of the Advisory Committee to the
2003 Amendments stating that: “Although an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits is not properly
part of the certification decision, discovery in aid of the certification decision often includes information required
to identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented at trial. In this sense it is appropriate to conduct
controlled discovery into the ‘merits’, limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an
informed basis”.
198

The 2003 Amendment Notes of the Advisory Committee explained the modification, as follows: “This
change avoids the possible ambiguity in referring to ‘the decision on the merits’. Following a determination of
liability, for example, proceedings to define the remedy may demonstrate the need to amend the class definition
or subdivide the class. In this setting the final judgment concept is pragmatic. It is not the same as the concept
used for appeal purposes, but it should be flexible, particularly in protracted litigation”.

The second modification involves the notice provisions in subdivision 23(c)(2),
authorizing the court to direct appropriate notice to the class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or
(2)199, and prescribing the mandatory notice requirements under a Rule 23(b)(3) class.
The third alteration is related to the process of settlement, voluntary dismissal and
compromise. Subdivision 23(e)(1)(A) clarifies that the settlement, voluntary dismissal, or
compromise is concerning claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class.200 According to
subdivision 23(e)(1)(B), in any of the mentioned situation the court must direct notice “in a
reasonable manner” to all binding class members in any class certified under subdivisions
23(b)(1) or (2) or (3).201 Also, in order to approve the settlement, voluntary dismissal or
compromise, the court must find through a mandatory hearing that it is fair, reasonable and
adequate (23(e)(1)(B). Subdivision 23(e) also establishes the requirements and process for
filling or objecting a settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise.
2. The Appointment of the Class Counsel and the Attorney Fees
The fourth group of alterations made by the 2003 Amendments to the Rule 23, of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, deals with the appointment of class counsel and the attorney
fees award.
a) Subdivision 23(g)
199
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reasons, there may be less need for notice than in a (b)(3) class action. There is no right to request exclusion
from a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class. The characteristics of the class may reduce the need for formal notice. The cost of
providing notice, moreover, could easily cripple actions that do not seek damages. The court may decide not to
direct notice after balancing the risk that notice costs may deter the pursuit of class relief against the benefits of
notice”. However, if a Rule 23(b)(3) class is certified in conjunction with a (b)(2) class, the (c)(2)(B) notice
requirements must be satisfied as to the (b)(3) class.
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Cf. Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, §1753.1, 53 (cited in note 79); 5 Moore’s Federal Practice,
§23.160 (cited in note 74).
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Cf. MCL 4th, §21.31, 285; §21.312, 293; Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, §1797.6, 196 (cited in note
79). Nonetheless, while Wright-Miller-Kane affirm that the 23(e)(1)(B) notice is not to be sent to those that have
already opt-out in a 23(b)(3) (Id., §1797.6, 196), in MCL 4th is asserted that even those persons should once
again be notified to check their interests “to opt back into the class and participate in the proposed settlement”
(Id., §21.312, 294). For a broad and deep critique to this second opt-out notice in Rule 23(b)(3) classes, see,
Rosenberg, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19, passim (cited in note 21).

The subdivision 23(g) improved the guidelines, requisites and procedure for the
appointment of the class counsel. As set by the Advisory Committee Notes, the new provision
is not creating an “entirely new element”, but it is built upon the judicial experience
recognizing the importance of the court’s evaluation of proposed class counsel. Before the
amendment, the sole provision that north courts in selecting the class representative and
counsel was that they must “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”, stated in
Rule 23(a)(4).
To the contrary of what happens in an individual litigation, where “a client chooses a
lawyer, negotiates the terms of the engagement, and monitors the lawyer’s performance”, in
class actions, this task is performed by the judge “who creates the class by certifying it and
must supervise those who conduct the litigation on behalf of the class. The judge must ensure
that the lawyer seeking appointment, as class counsel, will fairly and adequately represent the
interest of the class”.202
Hence, with almost the same contents of the subdivision 23(a)(4), concerning the class
representative, the subdivision 23(g)(1)(B) establishes that “an attorney appointed to serve as
class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interest of the class”. However, this
mandatory rule does not purport to supersede or to affect the interpretation of other legislation
that provides otherwise. For instance, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in various sections of §15 U.S.C.), that
contains provisions that bear on selection of a lead plaintiff and the retention of counsel.
In this sense, it is valid to affirm that the class counsel, conducting the class action, has
a much higher responsibility to the members of the class than a lawyer in an individual
lawsuit.
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Cf. MCL 4th, §21.27, 278. The 2003 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes the same way states: “Paragraph
1(B) [of subdivision 23(g)] recognizes that the primary responsibility of class counsel, resulting from
appointment as class counsel, is to represent the best interests of the class. The rule thus establishes the
obligation of class counsel, an obligation that may be different from the customary obligations of counsel to
individual clients. Appointment as class counsel means that the primary obligation of counsel is to the class
rather than to any individual members of it. The class representatives do not have an unfettered right to “fire”
class counsel. In the same vein, the class representatives cannot command class counsel to accept or reject a
settlement proposal. To the contrary, class counsel must determine whether seeking the court’s approval of a
settlement would be in the best interests of the class as a whole”.

The new subdivision also provides a method by which the court may make directions,
from the outset, about the potential fee award to class counsel in the event the action is
successful (Rule 23(g)(2)(C)).
The Advisory Committee Notes asserts that “class counsel must be appointed for all
classes, including each subclass that the court certifies to represent divergent interests”. In
such a case, the logical appropriate conduct is to appoint a counsel for each different class,
exactly because there are divergent interests within them, and a single lawyer would not be
able to perform his duties because this conflictual circumstance.203
Moreover, the new subdivision (g)(1)(C) stipulates the issues that the court must and
may consider in appointing the class counsel, serving also to inform class counsel seeking
appointment, as explained by the notes of the Advisory Committee.
The court must consider: a) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating
potential claims in the action; b) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other
complex litigation, and claims in type asserted in the action; d) counsel’s knowledge of the
applicable law; and, e) the resources counsel will commit to representing the class. And the
court may: “consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability of to fairly and adequately
represent the interest of the class”, and “direct potential class counsel to provide information
on any subject pertinent to the appointment and to propose terms for attorney fees and
nontaxable costs”, and “make further orders in connection with the appointment”.
b) Subdivision 23(h)
Even tough the Advisory Committee Notes affirmed that: “Fee awards are a powerful
influence on the way attorneys initiate, develop, and conclude class actions”, the new
subdivision 23(h) made no substantial modification, whatsoever, to the traditional system of
awarding attorney fees in class actions.
In summary, the rule stipulates the need of a motion for award of attorney fees to be
made according to Rule 54(d)(2); authorizes any class member or the party whom the
payment is sought to object the motion; prescribes the possibility of a court’s hearing and
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See, MCL 4th, §21.27, 278.

findings for its conclusion and refer to a special master or magistrate judge the issues related
to the amount of the award.
3. Attorney Fees Award
Although the work of the lawyer, as a class counsel in a collective litigation, has a
very peculiar position differently from the position he holds in ordinary, separate litigation,
the main incentive is the same in both situation: the compensation for a professional
exercising his job is his fees.204
Putting aside other factors that may stimulate the lawyer, as personal satisfaction,
social recognition, ideological, religious, or political motivations, the enticement for the work
done is the fees that compensates the investment (of time, resources, expertise etc.) spent in
the litigation.205
The plaintiff’s counsel, in class actions, is usually identified as a “private attorney
general”, the lawyer that prosecutes actions on behalf of numerous individuals similarly
situated, that they would not do it individually. It is said that the expression “private attorney
general” was created by Judge Frank delivering the opinion of the Second Circuit in the case
Associated Industries of New York State v. Ickes.206
Consequently, there is often a great inducement for the attorney to prosecute the action
because the large expected reward.
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See, Part IV, D.2.(a), supra.
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Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 941, 952 (19941995); Developments – The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1827, 1829 (1999-2000).
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“Instead of designating the Attorney General, or some other public officer, to bring such proceedings [to
vindicate of the public or the government], Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any nonofficial person, or on a designated group of non-official persons, authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an
officer in violation of his statutory powers; for then, in like manner, there is an actual controversy, and there is
nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from empowering any person, official or not, to institute a
proceeding involving such a controversy, even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such
persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals” (emphasis added), Associated Industries of
New York State v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d. 694, 704 (2nd Cir. – 1943). See, John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the
Plaintiff Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986); Deborah R. Hensler et al., Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing
Public Goals for Private Gain, 71-3 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice – 2000) (cited hereafter as Hensler, Class
Actions Dilemmas).

On the other hand, the attorney for a defendant class does not have much of incentive
to litigate the defense for the class. This is a consequence of the absence of a system that
optimizes the scale economy of aggregating the defendants to distribute the costs of the
litigation among all the class members.207
The most conventional method of compensating the plaintiff’s class counsel is the
“common fund”, where he creates or preserves a fund for the benefit of the whole class and is
paid with money from this fund.208
The court award of attorney fees is justified under the doctrine that members of the
class, in the collective suit, who obtained a benefit from the lawsuit without compensating for
its costs, are unjustly enriched.
There are two major methods, with some variations and combinations within them, to
calculate the attorney fees in “common fund” cases: (i) the “percentage method”, a percentage
of the fund generated by the lawyer activity; or; (ii) the “lodestar method”, based on the
number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the market rate of lawyers services.209
Hence, in defendant class actions, where there is a preexisting common fund or an
escrow account, the legal expenses that the representative party has incurred, especially the
attorney fees, are to be paid from those sources.210
Nevertheless, this is a very unlikely situation. In any lawsuit, a favorable adjudication
to the plaintiff will confer him either monetary award, or, an injunctive or declaratory relief.
On the contrary, to the defendant a victory is always a declaratory judgment. The
advantage that the lawyer confers upon the defendant class is to impede any money
disbursement, or, to establish by the court’s decision that the plaintiff has no dully rights or
claims enforceable against them. There is not any money to be collected which could be
partially used to compensate the lawyer’s work.
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See, Part IV, A, supra.
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See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970);
Central R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
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For commentaries and critique of both methods of calculating the attorney fees, see, MCL, 4th, §14.12, 186-

96.
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See, Cranston v. Hardin, 504 F 2d 566 (2nd Cir. - 1974); German Evangelical St. Marcus Congregation v.
Archambault, 404 S.W. 2d 705 (Mo. - 1966).

Alternatives to compensate the class counsel, based on the appointment of a wealthy
class representative, or, one that has a high stake in dispute, results invariably in fractional
aggregation of defendants.211
This rationale lacks consideration of the primordial scope of the collectivized
procedures that is to aggregate the defendants in order to attain economy and investment
scales in the litigation.
Other solution to create special interest organizations212 also does not suffice,
especially in cases where the defendants’ stakes are low, as it happens in television signal
piracy (DirecTV case) or copyrighted works violated through the Internet (Grokster case).213
Firstly, because there is not incentive for the aggregation of the defendants in such
organizations; secondly, these sorts of associations frequently have deficient resources to
engage in class action litigation.214
The optimal law enforcement system requires mandatory aggregation of plaintiffs and
defendants, and for its turn, the optimal incentive to the defendant class counsel is achieved
by awarding attorney fees by means of a fee-shifting system.
The method of awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party in the litigation, by
taxing the defeated party, is a rule in England and in most of civil law countries. It is often
referred to as “English rule” or “indemnity rule”.
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See, e.g., Wolfson, 38 Ohio St. L. J. 459, 485-8 (cited in note 98).
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We use the expression “special interest organization” because these organizations are concerned to the
interest of special sector of the society. Therefore, they do not, at least all of them, seek public goals, in order to
be called “public interest organizations”.
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In the Internet music downloading case, a special interest organization has been created: “Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF)”. In spite of the fact that it has helped individuals in separate lawsuits brought by the
copyright holders, it has not stepped up and required the certification of a defendant class. However, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed a class-action lawsuit against AT&T on January 31, 2006, “accusing
the telecom giant of violating the law and the privacy of its customers by collaborating with the National
Security Agency in its massive and illegal program to wiretap and data-mine Americans’ communications” (see,
its site www.eff.org , last visited on May 30th, 2006).
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See, Hensler, Class Actions Dilemmas, 71 (cited in note 206), arguing that: “(…) organizations such as the
American Liberties Union (ACLU), NAACP, and the National Organization for Women (NOW) do bring class
actions. But, in practice, most public interest organizations also have insufficient resources to engage in
systematic monitoring of corporate behavior and extensive class action litigation”.

In the United States, the so-called “American rule” or “statutory rule” stipulates that
each party bears his own litigation expenses, including the compensation for his lawyer.215
Nevertheless, fee-shifting rules are provided in several statutes and mostly “serve the
public policy of encouraging private enforcement of statutory or constitutional rights”.216
In addition, the Rule 11, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for legal
ethics and good faith in litigation, establishing sanctions for frivolous representations to the
court, which includes the payment of “some or all the reasonable attorneys’ fees” in favor of
the movant party.
The test for the “prevailing party” in fee-shifting case was created by Supreme Court
in Buckhannon Bd. &. Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res., as the one
that has altered its legal relationship with its adversary through a judgment or consent decree
entered by the court.217
Although there is a vast literature on the economic analysis of fee-shifting, our
assumption advances the subject of the attorney fees for the defendant class lawyer.218
Even though it our understanding that defendant-favoring fee-shifting is the optimal
mechanism for every defendant class action, our focus is on the analysis of suits where the
defendants’ stakes are low, stimulating nuisance value suits brought by plaintiffs.
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See, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 249, 250 (1975) (“In the United
States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser”.
“[t]he general practice of the United States is in opposition [sic] to it; and even if that practice were not strictly
correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute”.
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Cf. MCL, 4th, §14.13, 196. Also: “Although, as will be seen, Congress has made specific provision for
attorneys’ fees under certain federal statutes, it has not changed the general statutory rule that allowances for
counsel fees are limited to the sums specified by the costs statute”. “[a]bsent statute or enforceable contract,
litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees”(Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 255, 256,
257 (1975).
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532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001).

For a survey of literature on fee-shifting, see, Kathryn M. Christie, Attorney Fee-Shifting: A Bibliography, 47
Law & Contemp. Probs. 347 (1984). For empirical studies of fee-shifting, see, Edward A. Snyder and James W.
Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 345,
377 (1990) (arguing that fee shifting encourages parties to litigate); Edward A. Snyder and James W. Hughes,
Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J. Law & Econ. 225,
249 (1995) (concluding that the English rule likely reduces the frequency of low-merit claims and lessens the
overall probability of litigation). For the effect of the different methods of allocation of legal costs on the level of
litigation, see, Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for
the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1982); Dewees et al., 10 J. Legal Stud. 155 (cited in note
190).

It is considered defendant-favoring fee-shifting, the fee-shifting on a one-way (or oneside) basis, granting fees only to the defendant attorney, when the defendants prevail in the
lawsuit, but not awarding fees to the plaintiff’s lawyer, even if he wins the case.
The proposed model addresses the problem of motivating the attorney, hence the class
representative, to present a defense, instead of just settling with the plaintiff in nuisance value
suit. The settlement is the likely solution in this kind of suit, because of the asymmetry
between the costs of separate litigation and the settlement offered by the plaintiff due to the
absence of the defendant class action. The settlement makes the defendant better off, in
separate litigation, but it does not in a collective procedure because the cost of litigation is
shared with the members of the class. The aggregation of defendants and the optimal attorney
fees award lead to the optimal law enforcement system.219
Similarly to contingent fees arrangements on the plaintiff’s side, the class counsel in a
defendant class action assumes the risk of the litigation.
Consequently, the strategies for the lawsuit are made on the lawyer’s assessment of
expected gains and losses, so he will only represent the defendants if the expected value of the
litigation is positive to him. The investment made by the lawyer equals the compensation he is
expecting to obtain with the fees.
The one-side fee-shifting compensates the lawyers’ legal services and the loan of such
services, with a higher risk of default than ordinary market loan, remaining in cases for many
years outstanding without any interest and to be repaid only and if the lawsuit is successful.220
Although there is not a conclusive analysis, based on empirical studies, about feeshifting effects on the level of litigation, or, the tendency of going to trial instead of settling
the case, or even, the increment of legal expenditures in trial; the use of defendant favoring
fee-shifting achieves the collective procedure goals of access to justice and equilibrating the
parties to the suit.221
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See the numerical examples in Part IV, B, supra.
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See, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 584 (cited in note 24).
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See, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 590 (cited in note 24); Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of
Law, 429-32 (cited in note 25).

In addition, the one-way use of indemnification is socially desirable in order to prevent
nuisance value suits. A plaintiff unwilling to go to trial because it would be cost ineffective
would refrain from filling a nuisance suit, as stated by Professors Rosenberg and Shavell:
“Under the British system, a plaintiff who would be unwilling to litigate would never
file a claim; in particular, nuisance suits would never occur” (emphasis added).222
The fee shifting system impedes nuisance value suit, since there are no actual
economic threats against the defendant, because the judgment in his favor would shift to the
plaintiff the costs that the former has incurred retaining a lawyer and other taxable litigation
costs.
Of course in circumstances where the plaintiff shows to be judgment-proof, the feeshifting rule would be inefficient. But this is not a peculiar situation for defendants’ attorneys,
as it can happen as well to the plaintiff’s lawyer. The solution would require a security for
costs posted in the outset of the lawsuit.223
Considering that there is no money changing hands when the defendant prevails, the
appropriate scheme to award the class counselor fees is the loadstar method.224
The court order certifying a defendant class action should appoint the class counsel
(Rule 23(c)(1)(B) combined with Rule 23(g)(1)(A)), requiring him to formulate a proposal of
fees. The proposal should present an estimate of the number of hours that reasonably should
be spent in the lawsuit, and the market value of the hourly charges for lawyers services (Rule
23(g)(1)(C)(iii)).
The advantages of the defendant-favoring fee-shifting system are: (i) overcome the
asymmetric costs between separate litigation and collective suit, aggregating the multitude of
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Rosenberg and Shavell, 5 Internat. Rev. Law and Econ. 3, 5 (cited in note 169). See, also. Shavell,
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 399 (cited in note 25); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang,
An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and The Role
of Rule 11, 25 J. Legal Stud. 371 (1996).
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See, MCL, 4th, §14.13, 197.

defendants, (ii) compensate the class counsel by equalizing his investment in the litigation
with the amount of the fees award; and, (iii) preclude nuisance value suits.

V. Conclusion
In the 21st Century, the idea of “mass society” has deeply evolved. People are living in
an information society, where the furnishment of services and goods are made by
sophisticated communications links, especially by Internet. These massive and expeditious
relationships induce lawful and unlawful behaviors. Therefore, a substantial modification on
the law enforcement has to be realized by the law operators and a choice of solutions to be
made in order to achieve the optimal enforcement level.
In order to achieve this goal, the ideal model of law enforcement system grants
everyone the best well-being, before and after the fact of a given situation, due to optimal
deterrence of unreasonable risks, optimal insurance of reasonable risks, and optimal
redistribution of wealth by progressively funding the preceding two elements. This theory is
based on the individuals’ rational choice of their maximum well-being.
The option is to use mandatory defendant class action because it confers individuals’
maximum well-being, as it takes into consideration the deterrence function of the law as well
as its insurance objective. The result is that the ideal of distributive justice is better served,
with the procedural law being considered as a tool to achieve the principles enacted in the
substantive law.
The mandatory defendant class action permits dispersed individuals to exploit scale of
economy and investment in the common defenses in the litigation. Furthermore, the
compulsory aggregation of defendants and defenses avoids the threat of nuisance value suits
to be brought by a single plaintiff, or even a plaintiffs’ class.
Besides mandatory aggregation of the defendants, the optimal law enforcement system
requires optimal incentive to the defendant class counsel.
Differently from the plaintiff’s perspective, a victory in the litigation to the defendant
is always a declaratory judgment. The advantage that the lawyer confers upon the defendant
class is to impede any money disbursement, or, to establish by the court’s decision that the

plaintiff has no dully rights or claims enforceable against them. Usually, there is not any
money to be collected which could be partially used to compensate the lawyer’s work.
Consequently, the optimal incentives to the defendant lawyer might be obtained by
awarding attorney fees by means of a fee-shifting method.
The specific model proposed is of a defendant-favoring fee-shifting, where the fees are
granted only to the defendant attorney, when the defendant prevails in the lawsuit, but no fee
is award to the to the plaintiff’s lawyer, even if he wins the case.
This method of awarding attorney fees considers the fact that the lawyer is assuming
the risk of the litigation. All strategies for the lawsuit are made on the lawyer’s assessment of
expected gains and losses, so he will only represent the defendants, if the expected value of
the litigation is positive to him.
Considering that there is no money changing hands when the defendant prevails, the
appropriate scheme to award the class counselor fees is the loadstar method, when the court
should require, at the moment of certification of the defendant class and appointment of the
counselor, an estimate of reasonable number of hours to be spent in the lawsuit, and the
respectively market rate for the legal fees.
The investment made by the lawyer equals the compensation he is expecting to obtain
with the fees. The one-side fee-shifting compensates the lawyers’ legal services and the loan
of such services, with a higher risk of default than ordinary market loan, remaining in cases
for many years outstanding without any interest and to be repaid, only and if, the lawsuit is
successful.

